Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie als intentional-historisches Problem

Derrida deconstructs the very notions of origin and exact science.

. . . . Attempting to undertake a sollicitation of science in the name of a certain necessary counterviolent gesture, it is strictly uncircumventable to investigate into the strategical resources of the originary sollicitation of philosophy as was undertaken by Jacques Derrida from the 60’s on. Only thus is such a paraphrasis, such a supplementary … Continue reading

On Arriving

…treatment of the catastrophe. Greek, katastrophē, first: the end (the end of life, the dénouement of a dramatic plot, the end of the play), and second, a reversal or upset, “the tragic and unforeseeable event that brings about the ruin of the established order. Catastrophe, therefore, relates as much to trajectories of truth, the very accomplishment, as to the “accident whose surprise interrupts the teleological trajectory.” Strephein gives strophe, “to come and go,” “to turn toward,” two senses: to sojourn, and swirling, wandering. But still the Odyssey of Ulysses, the first being the very form of an economy, the possibility of returning home. “Oikonomia would always follow the path of Ulysses.” He goes only in view of repatriating himself. Immune, the origin does not travel. Expatriation only lasts for a certain time, softened in advance; Penelope does everything to not “lose the thread.” “Phenomenology may no more be the absolute master of its house. Ontology may already be in its place.”

Transcendental Auto-Immunity

Transcendental Auto-Immunity

. . . . In the 1935 Vienna Lecture, published in Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, Edmund Husserl diagnosed the European sciences and their Lebenswelt, ‘life-world,’ as being ridden by crisis; transcendental phenomenology sought to assume the proper philosophical responsibility. The war and its aftermath, the rise of Nazism, etc., were … Continue reading

Scattered Sense: Calibration, Oontology

The ubiquitism of science: ambitions of the omni fluently transposed to commanding practical reality by way of omnispatiotemporal theories, conspicuous instances of which would be the panopticon and the panspectrum, virtual reality, the science of the masses in its double genitive, the science of the generic, euthanasia, etc. The ubiquitism of science—and ubiquitism is the very “ismism” of science—draws lines from Plato on, only now to crack.

Oontology, thus, cracks: the world egg harbours, or so it seems, nature’s auto-cataclysm. Seems it all was about fissuring, fissuring the convolutions, foldings and curvatures of phusis. Thus the Large Hadron Collider commands the clinamens and smashes subatomic particles to provide humankind with one monarchic Grand Unified Theory of Everything: one oon, egg. Crashes only, or so theory goes, in speeds approximately those of of light, will provide the smoothest possible oontology. Episteme qua egg. From Plato on, Deleuze and Guattari being oontology’s recently most fashionable proponents.

The oontologist epoch of science requires a strict regime of commanding the senses, making the senses “synergistic.” The only road thereto is by way of calibrating the human senses. Making a universe out of the originary supplementarity of disseminative sensiverses. This, science says, is the condition of possibility of authentic episteme. While sensiverses are calibrated towards unity, truth comes by blowing things to smithereens. This is theory.

Margins of Science


. . . Margins of Science . . “If there are margins, is there still a philosophy, the philosophy?,” . asks Derrida, targeting logocentric philosophy. Grafting: transposing, transcribing that question as to its scientific import one therefore asks: if there are margins, is there still a science, the science? If the alterity of the other … Continue reading

On Jacques Derrida’s Parasitology

“The virus is in part a parasite that destroys, that introduces disorder into communication,” alas! Paul De Man’s warning that “the impossibility of reading should not be taken too lightly,” is more than fit. What had not already Derrida said about ‘communication’ in Signature, Event, Context? We are still Kantians with a view to ‘communication.’ Newton’s ideological gravitational force made Kant fall, and the naive question asked: “What are the conditions of possibility of knowledge?” Still not daring to critically question the mythological horizon of our age old metaphysical tradition, we continue in the vein of Kant: “What are the conditions of possibility of communication?” How dare one call oneself a thinker without scrupulously inquiring after conditions of impossibility? And this is indeed what Derrida does. In his entire oeuvre, in fact.

When Future Futures

Heidegger wrote, for instance, that the world worlds (die Welt weltet), time times (die Zeit zeitet), language speaks (die Sprache spricht), or that the nothing nothings (das Nichts nichtet). But he would never write that the future futures (die Zukunft zukunftet).

Our conception of causality: is it not fundamentally founded upon a trope of an a tergo? There are, of course, conceptualizations suggesting ‘reversible time.’ Nonetheless, it is critical to ask for its motivation and actual import. Are, then, not these re-current notions in modern physics rather a gesture so as to expand the hold of past upon present and future? The billiard ball that gets hit by another ball: is it all past powers that act? How could it be? How could we be sure? Should we not rather try and allow ourselves, for once, for the sake of argument, be disturbed by the possibility that there is a certain futuricity that at all allows what we call causality?

Unidentified Flying Objects: Parallelism, Virtuality, Immanence, Transcendence

The specter, the revenant, and the revenance is coming from what is to come—futurity—in the degree to which we blind ourselves in our simulatory spatiality. Now there will always be interferences, because every gramma is simulation. But the spectrality is sounder, it seems, if recognized as of futurity, and not as a assemble belts from past to present, making its interruptions and disturbances the motive for maiming presence. If I should try to determine further what past is, I would say that it is to be related to the iterativity of futurity as what definitely will not come, only can not-come, already shit out of the what-is-to-come; this is what the past is, however “valuable” one may deem it, in other respects.

Radicalist Motifs in Contemporary Political Philosophy

Nancy, Deleuze, Zizek, Guattari, Agamben, Negri, Badiou, Rancière, Vattimo, Rorty, Habermas, and so many others: common for all these philosophers is a certain radicalism which constitutes their sensus communis [κοινὴ αἲσθησις, precisely]. They are radivorous in their political philosophy, feeding on the radix, wherein is instantiated yet other, more vigilant, modern and subtle, variants of political virographematics. Graphematics is multiplicity: infinite, and a creative force. It becomes viral and auto-immunitary only when its agents folds backwards, and lets the past present the future, when time is inversed. All radicalist variation of politics is thus destructive: it refuses and denegates the always supernumerous blossoming offerings from graphemathicity and strangely folds back to consume its own excremental remains. That is radicalism. And all the philosophers mentioned, usually praised for their “radical” stance on politics, and so many more in so many other fields of human agency, are in this bad habit of radicalism.

Irradicalism is thus what is called for. A melleistic politics: a politics whose principle of principles would be a future indefinitely futuring. A future that will never have been a present presence, and therefore beyond any of the all too common variations of the ontological modifications of presence. The secret of the ontological modification of presence is that it secures the mechanism whereby used and expelled is re-used and re-appropriated.

Rilke-Kandinsky-Benjamin: the Physiognomy of the Abstract Flâneur

Is the physiognomy of the abstract flâneur especially prone to suggestive commands and enslavement — just another, but more efficient enforcing of subjectivity, that is —, or does it point towards a simple regression and withdrawal, or does it represent a possible bettering of the conditions of possibility of subjectivity? Does the collagery efforts, then, of Rilke, Kandinsky, and Benjamin entail an even more subdued subjectivity, or does it lay claim to a more freed subjectivity? I will juxtapose fragments from the hands of these hegemonized moderns in a collage fashion to try to open up a possibility of an answer. Because whether they are taken to evince of good or bad, they are central “hegemonics” [“relics”] of modernity.