Scattered Sense: Calibration, Oontology

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Man is the only animal that

stumbles over the same stone.

(Spanish proverb)

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(Meditating upon Jean-Luc Nancy’s Scattered Love.)

Ubiquitism of science: ambitions of the omni fluently transposed to commanding practical reality by way of omnispatiotemporal theories,  conspicuous instances of which would be the panopticon and the panspectrum, virtual reality, the science of the masses in its double genitive, the science of the generic, euthanasia, etc. The ubiquitism of science—and ubiquitism is the very “ismism” of science—draws lines from Plato on, only now to crack.

Oontology, thus, cracks: the world egg harbours, or so it seems, nature’s auto-cataclysm. Seems it all was about fissuring, fissuring the convolutions, foldings and curvatures of phusis. Thus the Large Hadron Collider at CERN commands the clinamens and smashes subatomic particles to provide humankind with a single monarchic Grand Unified Theory of Everything: one oon, egg. Crashes only, or so theory goes, in speeds approximately those of of light, will provide the smoothest oontology. Episteme qua egg. From Plato on, Deleuze and Guattari being oontology’s recently most fashionable proponents.

The oon—the stable centre structuring the total, smooth, homogeneous, simple, continuous, originary, totalizing, unified, coherent, generic, etc.—is still clung to by theory; nature, or phusis, however, abhors oontology. As is amply evidenced by now. Oontology’s empirical credibility whither; theory refuses to relate to fact. And continues to accumulate its all too classic ideas on the simplicity of origin, the continuity of the derivation, production and analysis, and the homogeneity of different dimensions. Theory has sealed itself off, abandoned its own invention of the ta eonta (“the things that are”), taking shelter inside its sovereign, autonomous egg, ostracizing alternative theoretical endeavors. This theoretical egg supporting technoscience has built itself an enormous edifice of ad hoc prosthetics. Denegations, repressions, projections, transferals, diversions, etc., abound, forming a cloud around our proudest achievement: science.

Science surrounds itself with a certain ideology, as unconscious as it is fatal: that the scientifically systematic deployment of the oppositional, hierarchizing, ostracizing, binary workings of a graphematics that is always viral and parasitic will, somehow, not have ecodestructive impacts that compromise the underpinnings of same science. Accordingly science is bound to treat presumably unwanted ecodestructive effects as ‘side-effects,’ written off as eventualities of a merely historical, derivative, secondary nature. A battery of strategies for denial, denegation and repression thus surrounds science. Truth is, however, that the systematically intensified deployment of a virographematics not acknowledged for its double binds, parasitic and viral workings, etc., will necessarily effectuate an equally systematically intensified autoimmunitary reaction in nature as such. The ideology surrounding science thus helps to aggravate autoimmunitary conditions in nature.

A metaphor, from euthanasic medicine: life, diagrammatically represented by its “chaotic” fluxes, ends with a flattened, straight line. Science desires a flat, straight line. Could one not venture such a hypothesis? Parenthetic mention: one day there will be more than one occasion to read Levinas on Hitlerism and Agamben on the KZ to understand that there is a somewhat straight line from oontology to hitlerism. The chosen people chosen for genocide could have been only the preliminary step, a tentative experimental set-up, to what we see today: ecocide. In the camp there is not a people, but nature as such.

In 1976 an interview of Heidegger appeared (post mortem, as agreed, originally made in 1966) in Der Spiegel. A sentence strikes out: “Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten.” As we know Das Rettende is already at the center of the 1954 “Die Frage nach der Teknik,” and task is there: Wir fragen nach der Teknik und möchten dadurch eine frie Beziehung zu ihr vorbereiten. Frei ist die Beziehung, wenn sie unser Dasein dem Wesen der Technik öffnet (9).  Upon Der Speigel‘s question as to relations between the quoted sentence and several references to ‘democracy,’ wondering as to what political system might correspond to our technological age, Heidegger does not say it is not democracy. But neither does he say it is democracy: Ich bin nicht überzeugt dass es die Demokratie est (DS, 276). We could certainly read Levinas’ On Hitlerism as a cue here.

Now, the belief in the safe midst—the betwixt, its smooth proliferation and rhizomatics, its ontology and oontology—has all by itself, nonetheless, by its very own workings, proved itself egregious. I contend that the hypothesis according to which ‘nature in general is imminently susceptible to anthropogenic ecodestruction‘ is substantially, de facto and de jure, corroborated. In the degree to which we are unconscious about the oppositional, hierarchizing and ostrcizing, binary workings of a graphematics that is always viral and parasitic

Irrespective of how impressive egg boilers, moon landings and nanobots shine for the human senses and desires, what is critically decisive for nature as such is the total cost of the entire process to have such things produced and utilized. What does it cost nature to get parts of itself to be converted to egg boilers? One thing is a myopic eye that eagerly catches glimpses of the saliently fashionable and useful; another is the sum total of the actual and real import. For nature, what is ‘real’ is not moon landings and egg boilers as such. In this perspective one may ask the perhaps somewhat vexing question: what is our technoscientific culture really about? Why so widespread the rhetoric and discursive regimes according to which we dismiss the destructive import of technoscience as eventual “side-effects”?

According to this hypothesis, humans are to be considered as an immense force of autoimmunitary agency within nature in general. Via man qua antibody, nature has set out on a path of unheard-of autoimmunitary aggression. If man is this antibody agent installed in the midst of nature in general, then what is it that man has that effectively triggers such autoecodestruction? I contend the hypothesis that anthropogenic autoecodestruction is due to a graphematics geared to the eternally and universally identical, productions of identities of supraspatiotemporal status. The very noble goal of science, to obtain knowledge that is supraspatiotemporal and perfect instances of ideal objectivity, is nature’s worst possible foe.

Scattered senses on a surface, obliged by cosmic laws of energy and information, commanded by nature to constitute man as a massive antibody. In that case, will our hypothesis imply a nature’s spontaneously engendered, possibly transcendentally constituted, autodestruction? Alternatively, man’s agency as antibody would have to be defined as something allogenic, aberrational, something wholly other, allocratic, something coming to nature from the outside to destroy it.

This latter hypothesis, though, is as little viable as it is legible. Man is, of course, entirely of nature. Nature engenders, at some point, man, and what man produces is what nature produces. Man’s oontologism instantiates an agency that serves as autoecodestruction. Further, this autoecodestruction is not to be acknowledged by dominant discourses. To the contrary, hegemony has it that man’s activity, theoretical and practical, is of good. For man, for beast, for nature. Iff at all perceptions are allowed into these discourses that problematizes foundations, motivations, and consequences of (o)ontology, they will be ordained to the realm of the arbitrary, eventual, historical, temporary: so confident is oontologism of itself that whatever problem arises, it sure already has the means of overcoming. No need for adjustment.

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But let us leave oontology—and enter teratology and its monsters.

Human senses beyond the rhizomatic, no resemblance whatsoever. Beyond being,  scattered, dissembled, disseminated. Strictly allotropic the senses are thrown together, in-/onto a body—from beyond somewhere and from beyond from, and beyond beyond—making room, allowance, for so much philosophy, history, and creativity: en abyss. We write upon the sheet of nothing; and this is historicity; traces. The richest and the only well. This well of the nothing is met with a program: project manifolds of sheets betwixt, upon the nothing, incise grammas upon these, name these things being and oontology, episteme, and so forth, and have a morality of the radical evil to explain the fact of history of episteme.

The will to “togethering,” gathering, logizationing—besides the irradical question of such a will, a will: where does it come from? Need it be Kantian? Should it not rather be of same nature as that of the senses? A luck, a chance, a risk, an opening? In this opening is therefore contained the broadest possible condition of possibility—to speak to Kant—of its very touching, collusion, “cognition.” It would surely not fit any epistemics.

(In this throwedness, not Heideggerian to be sure, why should one let one’s flight, one’s velocity, be justed, adjusted, adjustifiable, justifiable, by an other likewise irradical and irrepairable throwedness? Should we not rather fly that line and then see what comes, what illuminates?)

Why systematize inevitable collisions? Why make collisions lines of flight and collisions in “empty” space, yes, and “empty” time? A science of collision, collision, would be very abstract, and let the collisions be, so be it, whatever—but not the Agambenian. It is not time and space empty—’empty’ relates to filling, being filled, full, half full, half empty, and no one has the right whatsoever to designate being such. Therefore one has to go further than being, being being thing, and non-thing, nothingness, too. The justifiable is beyond such banal measures.

The justifiable is there, somewhere, but not in touch or sync with any method or instrument. Methods, procedures, programs and instruments are rather what makes an impossible impossible—not, however, as in their possibilizationing. Our senses have difficulty understanding that between the flower’s honey and the honey sucking bee there are manifold beings already, not to be “seen,” “heard,” “touched.” But let us start with ‘nothing,’ precisely ‘Nothing,’ the very most enigmatic, collisional term.

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The nothing is the very well out of which everything and anything spring. Nigraphy: when you incise, you will write neither this nor that. Always something else, something other, elusive, strange: allocracy, the kratein, the cracy (not democracy), of the wholly other. This is where the Islam got it right; where it goes wrong is in its unconditional denegation of such a fact. Islam is a Hitlerism of details.

Bracket the naming necessities, those spectred varities of naming neuroses; naming is a crude activity. Still, naming as such, and naming something ‘nothing’ and ‘nothingness’ is in its own paradoxical and surely not-intended ways very telling, signaling, gramming. This is somewhat known to what so amply—and always so ready, so ready—is called ‘mysticism.’

The nothing is what the human sensitivity writes upon, the ‘nothing’ barred, then projected as a bibleion, far from any Greek hyle or any of its wooded prostheses into postmodern virtuality and hypertext. It is not fortuitous the constant proliferation of texts and sheets: it stems from religious belief in the ta eaonta, in oontology, in supraspatiotemporal science. So eager to write, incise, circumscribe, rescribe, proscribe, slice, cut, and trace and sewer—so eager rhizomes, growing on each plane like rats and grass. Still. Unfortunately. Now this is bibliology.

The entire history of thought (and history is always something of interest only for something like thought)—be it philosophical, mythical, theological, political—is this insistence that there is something for thought, something stable to rest on—and the stable always prevail according to this Platonian hypothesis—as if its invention of ta eonta was really of the supraspatiotemporal and as if thought only had to catch up from a mysterious lag induced by birth. Did not Socrates tell us this? At the same time this belief in the stable requires a repression of nothingness as its very condition of possibility. World was what it was, then entered bifurcation: nil and naught. Who can read the significance of the idea of the naught? If the world is full and plenty, whether charged positive or negative, why insist on creating a word like ‘nothing’?

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Thought denies performatively the nothingness of existence through acts of writing, acts that simulate there being something somewhere. “What is a paper and a pen?” This simulation—historically the simulation of being qua vase (or as Kinder Egg)—is as “empty”as the “nothingness” itself; it is a certain way of existence’s duplicating and doubling its own nothingness. It is nothingness running away from itself—or its inclination to do so. There is nothing ‘ substantial’ about this; it is only making room for a certain displacement whereupon true joy flourish: when thought makes no change except thinking that all of its creations are spontaneous, when thought stops thinking itself as a net, a web, a beholder.

The Greek vase and Heidegger’s interpretation of it is not sufficient, though they still and inevitably opens up their very sponte suaity. This affirmation of thought as a certain nothingness has nothing in common with that line of thought that starts out from Kant’s making of the transcendental simulation machine. Even Descarte’s earlier, perhaps default, version of it. A machine that continues to our time articulated as here high tech military apparatuses, there as the most advanced pedagogy—this thing that installs simulation machines in the human mind which itself is installed within nature, where its pivotal characteristic is the Husserlian parallelism where the transcendental and psychological ego is differentiated by a ‘certain’ sheet of nothing. Radicals and kings: blueness.

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Scattered senses: their irreducible physico-sensual perspectivism. The scientific commencement of processes of attuning each sense to each other, domesticated, intentionalized, an economy of taming, a restricted economy of instrumental ends—suppressing everything that produces tensions, everything that is of a general economy, everything allogenic. There will have been senses, and there was repression.

Science is just as much about this reciprocal processing of the senses as that of attaining knowledge. Scientific processes of the calibration of measuring, operative instruments and devices, are metaphorized practices from that anterior necessity of calibrating the senses, the two of which, if reciprocally calibrated in turn, is the very primeval condition for scientific knowledge. Senses attuned, instruments attuned: to both referent and referee. An ‘x’ stating that y is ‘y.’ Or, such is our paradigm. Look at the relation: x, or some alleity—some instituting itself as wholly other from what soon will be stated—, states that y ‘is’ y. Why would there be an x and a y there to begin with? Why should one even try be in compliance with this? Spinoza is thus mankind’s first prophet.

The instrumental calibration provides, it is assumed and so also with a certain good reason, the most assured means of efficiently calibrating the senses, the latter’s beacon relative the heterogeneous sense-universes (sensiverses); man according to the machine, machine according to the skeletal evolution, skeletal evolution according to ‘thingicity.’ Thingicity is whatever makes a thing a thing, the conditions of (im)possibility of the thing in general.

Man finds his rescue and consolation in the machine; his senses are to be modeled upon historical, eventual productions of machines and instruments. Only then rest. The calibration afforded by ever more complex machines appears for the senses as being corroborated as to approximate the absolute adequatio, the Hegelian absolute. The all too classic ideas on the simplicity of origin, the continuity of the derivation, production and analysis, and the homogeneity of different dimensions, affects the whole process of the calibration of senses and sense. The identity of the thing is to be assured and judged by our different senses: our sensuality is expected to produce a unanimous verdict. The different senses sense the thing as it is, sensus communis. Theory has it that origin is simple, that derivation, production and analysis is continuous, and that the different dimensions are homogeneous. But is this theory not plagued by being presumptuous? This question is all the more plausible as the scientific installing of autoimmunitary conditions in nature intensifies.

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There are several different calibration processes: calibrating the senses to each other, calibration of instruments and devices, the reciprocal calibrating of instruments and senses, and also the as it were ontological calibration where parts and slices of reality are chosen so as to respond to the complex of senses and instruments. Strangely, in a sense it seems as though the referee is steadily loosing terrain, marginalized, becoming the auxiliary of machinery. Which, and for good reason, has been thematized many a time. Doubtless, the history of thought goes from thing to emancipation.

Science makes itself, and can no longer rely on the human senses alone; in a very real sense, man obeys the commands from machines doing science, doing the measurements and the operations. Even if calibration historically is first a means in evolution and survival, it arrives at its end only by being corroborated in turn by external standards, whatever they may be: we internalizes what is external, inversalizes. We take part of the spacetime curvature, that is. We, therefore, say there is energy for a turn.

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The thing calibrates the senses; not the other way around. There is only the stone’s philosopher, not the philosopher’s stone. It exerts its gravitational pull and makes the senses cluster around it. The senses cannot but comply since survival depends on, not things being “grasped” as they are, or perceived or represented accurately, but senses being grasped by the thing.


It is thingicity that grasps—and understands. Senses only comply. But thingicity cannot do this, cannot have the senses comply, without calibrating the senses, calibrating senses that starts out scattered upon a body of thick and fleshy surfaces. And so the senses are scattered according to what seems an ascending order, from the coarsest sense of flesh and touch itself, through tasting, smelling, hearing, seeing, touching, thinking.

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And in all living beings there is a form of thinking, or cognition. But all these senses have their own khora, and what separates them only imagination or madness can speculate in; the various senses articulates incommensurable universes, decisively different beings for which there neither are differences of positive terms nor common criteria, however much one tries the calibration. But still gravitation and calibration occur. But as the constitution of senses is not homogeneous—a rather salient fact, and in many a sense—we cannot sense if what omits these particular sense registers are of vital character. Whence technology; but it is the thing itself that requires these “auxiliaries” of sense. Really its own auxiliaries.

Since the whatever given auxiliaries too exerts a gravitational pull on the senses, the senses will be doubly calibrated, or rather manifoldly calibrated. But does technoscience tighten the lacunas, orifices and apertures? To make a complete “picture”? Clearly we anthropoids, from our point of view, operate with a view to tighten, and this by recourse to making the auxiliaries ever smaller and ever bigger. But this way we risk only becoming myopic to an extent we never before were. Aggravating, making our gravitational cage even more heavy.

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The thing, or more generally thingicity, calibrates the sensiverses, then. The thing puts itself sovereignly as the standard according to which the work of the senses is to be judged, commanded, and bred. But is the thing to judge? Without the thing the senses would truly float around not even remotely knowing of each other, as if tantamount to properly parallel universes. And what would the act of seeing be, be it unaware of the other senses, or other types of gravitational forces? Psychosis is disintegration, or accalibration, then, of the senses. Another crack there, since the experience of the psychotic seems valuable to knowledge. (Derrida on Foucault’s project on the history of madness.) That certain nothing of which Husserl speaks relative the difference without positive terms between the empirical psychology and the transcendental psychology clearly gives us a hint in the right direction to think—sense—the gravity of the question involved here.

But then again, the resolve, the consolation, is precisely not here, present, somewhat existent, as if the senses reciprocally guaranteed against madness; no one knows what possibilities of communication and “true” calibration there exists as to safeguard the one or the other sense’s blind wandering towards the thing it thus would know so incredibly little of.

Only the thing reassures us, therefore, since it gives itself to our imaginerary and symbolic mirrors as that entity X of which import Immanuel Kant was so obsessed with and which by purportedly being unitary also somehow conferred unity on our consciousness of objects be they material or conceptual. Only the mirror of thingicity in general, the very X, let us continue our descendance in gravitation towards the thing. What would, by the way, happen to anthropoid sensority if thing were to be reached by it, if the thing were to have sensority fall down upon itself? As when the fall once were completed? Without knowing more of anthropoid sensority, it is a scandal the speed with which we now allow ourselves to fall towards the things. We have already conceptualized this process in terms of the different phases of processes of inversalization. The blind spots in our sensoriates, the lack of interconnectedness, the lack of communication thereof, all this prepares a rigorous mismatch between the thing that pulls and the thing that hits the ground. A geography of tragic import.

Herein lies also the dysfunction in-built: the thing has all time it needs, temporality, time and death being totally irrelevant to it; sensiverses know they will extinct, quit, stop. (If not, then, death simply signals the place where the individual’s senses have reached thingicity. We put this in parenthesis.) This radical difference, or of course better is irradical difference, it is nothing that can stop from articulating itself. So what happens is bound to happen, at this time or the next. The thing doesn’t wait, it is whatever it is — and it exerts gravitational forces upon our sensiverses and calibrates and corroborates them according to its own atemporal indifference. Heteroceras we are. Tiny meteors gravitating towards Tellus, hitting that thing; who died when those gave life to our earth?

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Only flesh and bones, the sense that touches and lets itself be touched, can change thingicity from what it is, whatever that is. From flint comes large hadron colliders; all about cutting into things, being “grammarian.” Sure is that it signals a will, somewhere, or rather perhaps an emergent property in existence, to alter its own thingicity. And as sure it is that we are its instruments, calibrated to do precisely what we today are in the making of. It would make no sense to state otherwise, since there is very little reason to believe that the anthropoid just by itself were able to alter existence, or refrain from so if so were dealt. Still it is not obvious that whatever the thing does it does right, or does as we saw right, or does as it itself perhaps somehow intends. Here we glimpse a new way of reading Heidegger’s dictum in Zein und Seit according to which Dasein is the being for which, “in its very being, that being is at issue for it,”[1] because—citing Jean-Luc Nancy’s A Finite Thinking

this “is at issue,” this il s’agit de, this es geht um, this “it is about,” doesn’t bring into play an interest that is merely theoretical or speculative. Rather, it destroys the supposed autonomy of such an interest. If, in Dasein, it is being that is at issue [il s’agit l’être] (and if, without playing on words than language itself does, being is a matter of action [l’être est de l’agir]), it is because being, as the being of Dasein, is what is at stake [l’enjeu] in its conduct, and its conduct is the bringing into play [la mise en jeu] of being.[2]

This we see immediately. But different from what Heidegger possibly meant or strove to mean, and no less from what Nancy does. Further on he specifies the specificity of Heidgger as consisting of “thinking being as the fact of sense and sense as the gift of being,” and from Zein und Seit he provides  that “the sense of being can never be contrasted with beings, or with being as the supporting ‘ground’ of beings, for a ‘ground’ becomes accessible only as sense, even if it is itself the abyss of senselessness.”[3] In the Heideggerian Dasein it is being that is at stake. But not in the way that Heidegger envisioned.

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No single sense have any means of communicating with another sense. The definition of survival is thus ‘senses calibrated.’ They communicate via the via rupta, the laborious errancies of tuning one sense to another via some externality believed to present alike for all the human sensiverses. Until the senses are so reciprocally confluenced that the content in one sense modus is affirmed in the other such modi; of course only in terms of registerable practical effect. Body as omnisensual, homosensual, directing itself only, irresistibly as it were, to the object; all sensiverses thus conflate on the object.

The natural calibration for survival thus opens the possibility of the calibration of the thing, soon to be constituted as ‘ob-ject,’ something thrown, there, before us. Our sensiverses having become a universe and universal, soon strives to make itself a simple mirroring of the object; telos and eschaton, our newly arrived Gods, have entered. Senses scattered find themselves irresistibly pulled towards the object, soon indistinguishable from the object. In the process of calibrating the senses with a view towards obtaining a perfect representation of the object, one soon finds that certain prostheses, built by analogy with our senses, are far more precise in measuring the object. From spontaneous, “phusical,” calibration of the senses enabling survival, to poietic calibration by way of ever more refined machines. As calibration gradually closes the perceived gap between thing and representation, as calibration makes senses and thing conflate, converge, as sense is about to make its precise landing on whatever is not itself, these shrinking breaches are soon to be perceived as ever more crucial to close. The heterogeneous/spontaneous and the poeitic/autonomous calibration of the sensiverses with a view to conflating sense with thing, invents machines with which to calibrate the human senses further into microcosm and macrocosm. But the only true court of judgment as to the accuracy of the calibration in the degree to which calibration supersedes the acute need of survival, lies in action, in practical efficiency.

One can here say that the object has served as the standard allowing the manifold of senses to be calibrated according to itself, the senses being its various outer spheres and the instruments intervening in/with the object. Sensuality become the thing itself, conflated with the thing, magnetized by the thing itself; not only such, but in such a way that this sensual thought compund acts like capital, as if it was capable of being whatever thing’s equivalent. Valence. Things have a greater gravity, mass, than does our anthropoid sensuality. Our senses virtually fall onto, upon the object, become literally labile. In our sensual apparatuses lies an inherent lability. Capital is lability, capital being the symbol of the transvaluta, conflated senses. Scattered, then labile capital.

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One should here ask what concern thingicity has with mesmerizing anthropoid sensority to such an extreme extent, where sensority cannot but fall onto properly obsessed with thingicity; however, thingicity uses anthropoid sensority as a means to have itself altered by technics. But then, eo ipso, is all agency of sensority precluded; cognition, as we know, is no less fawned by thingicity than is olfaction. The motive inducement therefore must lie in the things themselves. Neither haptics nor acoustics nor any other of the sense modi has the motivational aptitude; the systematic irreversibility with which this gravitational force exerts itself, and the anthropoid history just as systematically not having resistance to it, more than suggests that the philosopher’s stone really is the stone as philosopher, or the stones’s philosopher. It is the one that seeks knowledge.

The stone, the thing, thingicity in general, is the star around which sense orbit and eventually fall towards: Stone exerts a gravitational pull on sense. Calibration is the means of the fall. Stone, further, has eventually machines to perfect the alignment of sense to itself. By us named knowledge, we already see that from this perspective this fall of the senses towards thingicity could be given other names. Numerous questions would arise. Beyond any measure of anthropocentric narcissism one should approach the question as to nature’s motivation. There is thing, sense, calibration—and output. The process of calibration is so efficient that man experiences it as autonomous, as of his own, as of his own free will, as indicative of his mastery over things. Man flatters himself with having produced oontology, a means toward altering things and nature: he the shepherd of all things. Things exert gravitational pull on senses, by means of a battery of methods of calibration, the beholder of these senses lured to experience the process as autonomous—but what is the real outcome? Again man is lured: myopically he stares at his fantastic inventions and discoveries (egg boilers, moon landings, nanobots, etc.), and stays there. Things see this altogether differently: egg boilers, moon landings, and nanobots are only eventual, secondary, historical, derivative side-effects. What things really accomplishes is their autodestruction, or autoalteration. And again: when man eventually is forced to acknowledge the destructive output of his fine oontology, he will be bound to be inclined to describe it as a side-effect, something that the simple bettering of his oontology will square out, given time. Thus thing works undisturbed towards fundamentally altering itself, if not towards its autodestruction. This is the content of our autonomy. Hegel would have it that the ulterior motivation was the absolute’s perfectly synthetic contemplation of itself. Transcendental philosophy’s intentional consciousness, its in tentione, a vibrant tension, is what experience is while hitting the ground, thingicity.

Senses secretly sense (senses, too, are of thingicity) that they can’t alter thingicity just by orbiting around things, however fast or whatever speed they there arrive. To crack things open, the sensiverses need instruments, machines, experimental set-ups and apparatuses—­only to again find itself faced by further new surfaces and curvatures to get clutched to. CERN’s Large Hadron Collider provides the ultimate example. Thingicity has been awaiting this LHC for a long time. The sensiverses “want” to crack the code of its omniverse so much that we even risks collapsing matter altogether, the singularity of infinite density, producing a black hole. What’s the event horizon, beyond which there is no return? We senses the Black Hole, already. Thingicity is the Black Hole, its anchestor. Sensiverses are the first signs of a brooding Black Hole. The ek-sistence of Heidegger forewarns of the gravitational curvature bending and clutching the sensiverses.

An it—thingicity—that is more it, incommensurably beyond and more “originary,” than the Freudian Id, albeit this Id is structurally secret with the it-stone, basically affirming what psychoanalysis affirms relative life’s detour to its originary it: life is a detour to death. The detour is simply the plenum of sensority’s gravitation. Before “death” again comes, closing the gap between the Id and the it, then attracting still other sensitories. The destinerrance of life always already begins with death. A little fluke, a bizarre vibration of death—as if it was coming to life.

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The sensitory falls faster than does the flesh upon which the sense modi is inscribed. Or one could say that the body itself constantly falls, the various modi having different speeds, vision being the fastest—after thought, of course. The lightest bodies fall and gets clutched the fastest, against Galileo and Newton; thingicity will this way further its coalescing, its surface therefore being “sensiversed,” senses orbiting the sun-thing. There is thus an inversion of terms: senses get migrated and

The escape velocity—the minimum speed at which an object needs to travel so as to escape a source of gravity without falling back into orbit before stopping—of the sensiverses: he velocity necessary to escape from an object’s gravitational field (called the object’s escape velocity) depends on how dense the object is; that is, the ratio of its mass to its volume. A black hole forms when an object is so dense that, within a certain distance of it, even light is not fast enough to escape, since the speed of light is slower than the black hole’s escape velocity. Unlike in Newtonian gravity, in general relativity, light going away from a black hole doesn’t slow down and turn around. The Schwarzschild radius is still the last distance from which light can escape to infinity, but outgoing light which starts at the Schwarzschild radius doesn’t go out and come back, it just stays there. Inside the Schwarzschild radius, everything must move inward, getting crushed somehow at the center.

No longer, perhaps, a matter of force effects of sensiversal gravitation are to be ascribed to spacetime curvature—which is part of thingicity itself.

But as this goes without saying: the sum of efficiency closing up on thingicity is far greater and heavier now than ever before—and this signifies the living difference, or différance if one will. As Derrida says: one does not need to wait for deconstruction to happen; it happens and is at work within all things. Its emblem today being inversalization in ecohistory.

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A Very Short History of Humankind: inversalization.

1. Somewhere some men start out on colonizing spaces, first nearby and local, regional, continental, eventually the whole globe, first by ananke, eventually by accumulation of capital, first detrimental to other men only, eventually to all life. But colonizing space is, eventually, not enough: there is yet more to eat into. Resources for growth reside not solely in the spatial. The first spatial phase of inversalization expands eventually, that is to say when there is no more space available, and enters the second: temporal colonizing, colonizing times.

2. Total spatial colonization procured, at some point in time there is a situation where a given contemporary reproduction of humankind is on the very threshold of what a given temporary totality of nature can sustain without crossing vital thresholds.

a. Initially, temporal colonizing appropriates the temporally residing resources of a few coming future generations of humanity, exploiting resources contemporarily available such that those few generations will inherit a less fruitful globe.

b. Eventually, inversalization is bound to enter second stage of temporal colonization, where humankind’s organization of its total appropriation of resources breaches the “time barrier”: exploitation has reached such levels that the future of humankind itself is at stake. Irreversible ecodestructions are plenty, but still restricted, still non-total.

c. Third stage is where conditions of life in general is at stake, where the irreversible ecodestructions affect the very future itself, time in general. Inversalization consumes itself at this point, life inverted from full and plenty till terminal perishing.

Inversalization is thus the final terminal of spatiotemporal colonization. And such is the history of humankind.

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The supraspatiotemporal imperative of scientificity in general is structurally linked to humankind’s spatiotempovorous agency. Science desires that which is neither of the temporal nor of the spatial, it desires what is no longer of spatiotemporality. Science desires theories and practices lodged, not in the hither world, but in some obscure thither world. As regularly stated: only standards found in the thither enables legitimacy and validity to the hither. The other, the strange, thus the allos, is brought to bear upon the same and the similar. Science’s spatiotempovorous agency is therefore allocratic. As amply evidenced by now, allocratic science, applying supraspatiotemporal measures that colonize first space then time, prepares for a real apocalyptic event.

The conception of the omnispatiotemporal, so often used to describe the noble end of science, thus betrays a falsity: contrary having validity and legitimacy for all times and spaces, virtually eternally and infinitely, the omni thus signals the abrupt inversalization where life gets sucked in, inverted, exterminated. It is the final solution of Hitlerism. The plane of conscious intention is here irrelevant; look to the plane of concrete effects. That there is an efficient motive, is certified in the degree to which these concrete effects are upheld systematically. Which should answer our question. There exists a plot, a motive, and an alibi.

And thus Virilio’s dromology fails, utterly. Things are not speeding up, accelerating. Virilio warns of the perils of what he understands as human societies speeding up all their processes of production and reproduction. Systematic autoecodestruction is not at all about speeding up. On the contrary, what we subejctively experiences as a speeding up, is, in a bigger frame, only the speeding up of decelaration: the acceleration of deceleration. The inversalization effects a violent brake on all things. This brake is, as in a dream, experienced as a rushing, a hurrying, but what it really is, for nature as such, is a violent bringing to halt, stoppage, termination. Certainly, inversalization is taking place at a staggering pace, but its full, real effect is perishing.

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15

Reason is not autonomous; by letting itself be absorbed by the quidditas of heteronomous forces, though, it re-assumes totality, its totality being that of the eventual and arbitrary totality of things gravitated to.

  1. There are no accidents; a car crash is the moth being caught unconditionally, irresistibly by the flame-thing
  2. A child’s paintings: an example of a sensiverse which is still not fully determined and detrimental, irreversibly maximized in terms of efficiency of inversalization, but still doomed to enter systematic calibration. “Children needs to learn how things really are.”

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16

But to convey intervening efficiency sense needs instruments, auxiliaries amenable to sense, auxiliaries hard and precise, able to intervene where senses alone never can. (The stone’s philosopher is molded such that his senses will crave for action, altering.) The passive aggression of the senses; letting itself gravitate and conflate with thingness in general and whatever that may be, whenever, wherever, sense now all of a sudden (yes, all of a sudden in the literal sense) intervenes in and on the thing. It wants itself to act as and be a superthing, that is to say not only a thing that attracts sense, but a thing that does this as well as intervening and changing other things—even be they other human beings. The anthropoid superthing usurps—or so it seems to itself for itself—the pre-anthropoid agency accounting for things and their changes.

To the extent there is communication it is only in the mode of an always already calibration process. Only the thing can function as that standard that calibrates scattered senses. It is a gathering in the Heideggerian sense. What happens thus with the senses?

In a certain very real sense, all of reality, or nature in general, is calibrated — and calibrated to whatever machine eventually there is. Susceptibly. Therefore, it is the rather erratic, “destinerrant” evolution of technoscience which thus dictates what nature is, what it can be, or at least what it for the time being be. Nature doesn’t phenomenalize as once believed. The technicization of all of reality must accordingly be brought about just as erratically as the instrumental evolution. Political incentives clustered around values production and accumulation of capital order technoscience thus ordering nature. What does it mean that nature is calibrated by technicity? In science, instrument calibration is common procedure. A new instrument gets adjusted according to preestablished standards, be it units of measurement or whatever, the failure of which would labilize the instrument and therefore our understanding as to what was measured or what was intervened into. A practical operational definition, so to speak. To calibrate nature would therefore come to mean that process whereby the calibrated set(s) of instruments serve as standards for calibrating nature, adjusting nature to those standards,

As machines develop, accordingly will reality be calibrated precisely using machinery as its external standard.

One is not interested in getting to reality as it is in itself; too philosophical this.

One is content with spectacular and financial ends and interventions, and as one now know that the machinery is in constant reelaboration and refinement, one also knows that reality is the very source and resource for infinite wells of spectacular and financial viabilities.

In the article Taming the Pancam the relationship is simply, and conveniently, inverted. What is omitted is the fact that it is all about technics taming the senses.

Mathematics: the paradigm and abstract machine of all warring. The one and/or the two: being, will, devotion, desire. The three adds warring, and four still more.  The formal scheme of war. Bringing the very conception. The peace and silent beauty of mathematics only presupposes and feeds on warring of numbers.

mark (a gauge or instrument) with a standard scale of readings.

• correlate the readings of (an instrument) with those of a standard in order to check the instrument’s accuracy.

• adjust (experimental results) to take external factors into account or to allow comparison with other data.

Calibration is the set of operations that establish, under specified conditions, the relationship between the values of quantities indicated by a measuring instrument and the corresponding values realized by standards

Ubiquitism’s attritionary interventions, hidden behind short-term efficiencies of proper machines, transferred through pen or electrical signals, a bureaucratized attrition irrelevant, ignorant, indifferent—nature usurped for purely administrative uses. Its benefits banal, inflating the markets; repressed, denegated is its real repercussions and ramifications (ramifier, French: form banches). Consummator, con/summa; rebounding away from the egg, with its particular repercussions. Analogously Agamben’s work on the camp and modern democratic politics, we do may maintain that science works like a total administration where nature is the bare life and where nature is whatever is confined within the walls of the camp. There are no rules, since it is a science in a state of exception, etc., etc. But this would be way too easy, however true it in fact is in a certain perspective. We need rather to complement this image with the auto-immunity of thingicity in general. The advance in theories and affections of administration and management has meant that as the politicized camp has enlarged and become the camp—or the village, whatever you like—of globalism, science has expanded its scope and depth immensely; the little workshop and laboratory has aggrandized in opposite directions from its safe, dry, middle-sized mesos; mesotique/endotique. 

The successive chains of local successes remain indifferent to its overall global effects. Scientific success calibrated relative the laboratory. It’s all about making the workings of science generic, making a supposedly non-vicious circle affirming itself in and by its interventions (as not viciously circular). In science you never have a complete refutation, only partial, and so is affirmed really the whole undertaking.

Humankind rapt (Latin raptus, seized)/enthralled by steam machines, Large Hydron Colliders, and nanomachines. Spellbound by everything ecotoxic.

Saying we are these machines, a metaphorical work believed to get sharper, more articulate and literal, as the chains develops. To let be, to let being be, says Heidegger. And that care—Sorge—is an existential of Dasein. Far from what is the case. The Sorge—the to make sure that …, or to take care of …—and the sorrow that is close in terms and being; controversial by reference to sensiverses scattered and “mothed.” The Sorge here acquires surely a new sense. And the sorrow of it covered by propagation of convenience and desire production.

Such is supposed to be the only way to have the voice have its work done, the voice something that never tolerates silent refusal, silent reposition. The voice being the machine that propels communication and coordination of frissoned sensiverses calibrated to a natural surgery in global service of thingicity’s irreversible auto-immunizing. Infection, affection, working by solus and ipse.

The impossible conflict between Narcissus and Echo, the echo never being exactly what Narcissus wants it to be, always already différant, always demonstrating that a sentence may always be put between two other. And an instrument between or inside an other. Fissuring, producing such frissons in the sensiverses.

So in a strange sense we might seem to imply that the thing, the stone, has knowledge of itself, surrounded and orbited constantly by the senses. Heterocera, moths.

The bottled message at open sea: the minimum image of communication. No matter what, somewhere there will always be a recipient, a decoder.

Even where concerns the vast oceans communication has its chances; it might always arrive, be received, and thus deciphered.

But even at shore the everyday communication recurs and re-occurs¾which thus is never ‘communication’ proper. The very fact of recurring testifies that there is no communication strictly speaking. Communication works, as often said and agreed, for “pragmatic purposes” and only to a certain degree, a degree of which it would be impossible to define further. Scientific communication requires highest possible degree of exact entities to be communicated and reciprocally understood; accordingly is created machines and devices independent of human sensority—as if one not only just postponed the inevitable work of the sensiverses. If in everyday communication we experience mis-understandings and the like, the consequences will be tiny local ones, whereas in science the consequences are potentially fatal.

But the image of the bottled message ensures and relieves our secret knowledge and experience that communication never simply is, simple, proper, homogeneous, etc. Protected, monadic, atomic, sheltered, “embottled,” etc.; still it conveys, conversely, the probable image of communication in general: a tiny message tried secured with rather fragile means always at risk never arriving anywhere.

So it is that these marks here will never arrive at “destination.” Destination of conception and conception of destination is fraud of metaphysics, untenable always and already; who could ever know destination? One can always ask for what, when, where, how, and when of the criteria for the what, where, how, and when of the destination in question. It is not so much that such is open for debate; debate is where parties have relatively reasonable but divergent views on a matter at hand of which those parties share a concern. No such thing applies for destination.

This fact is what accounts for the existence of marks and sounds put between our heads. Without the irradical absence of destination language would be superfluous and extinct.

Did the marks have to arrive at this recognition?

Where the mark shows itself to be anything but what it supposed itself to be?

The mark is smouldering¾and more and more reveals itself to be am incision, rather crude, a cutting with a pointed gesture, an autopsy on the dead body of the skin and the paper and the electronic fluid.

And this system of marks it is that we build science with.

At this point—consecrating skin, paper, and electronics—it gets important to blur the distinction between organic and inorganic—or?

Or does the blurring witness something else?

Does it witness blurring as such?

Such that a distinct logos always in need of securing itself against its outsides—its outsides, or perceived as such, since what is at stake is also here the problematics of the proper outside¾turns out to be the example of blurredness?

An unconscious blurring waking up—where non-communication ends up more realistic and real than what not.

What happens to the world after this? “Communication” is what brought about the ultimate transgression, why, of course, religion and religious faith is here a structural necessity.

The ultimate and very eschatological transgression is already made: the cannibalism and regicide—parricide—and incest is globalized and futurized.

So much for the politico-economical focus on aspects of production and consumption.

Baitaille’s sovereignty is another weak point.

What he recommends, what he reminds us, is already in place as the most unanimous paradigm for doing politics for centuries, since the great Leviathan came shore.

Meaningless expenditure, excess. A pedovorous and allophageous culture is what we have, a great Leviathan eating nature. Muhammed is one instantiation of human culture: a pedophile, tremendously aggressive, relating exclusively to what is not us, here, this side.

The whole philosophical apparatus, and thus no less science, is an architectonics build on fear and terror; mana!

The way language universally builds itself witness and testifies to this.

There is not one concept that are not logocentric, claiming absolute knowledge as possibility and end, telos, to be attained given time.

There is something to be found, that founds the all, and that gives the journey a meaning.

But no real threat is considered.

One must ask what is the relevance of the line from mana to actualized mass destruction.

Everything we do is mediated by text, or textuality, texere, a graphematic weaving; second, there is precisely a Nothing outside textuality, which texere always already tries to suppress, repress—by a paper or two —but which only comes forth even more as suppression is exerted, compressed forcefully as streaming through the gramma.

The gramma will, moreover, live a life on their own, move on, sur-vive, after my death, after your death, move essentially as I dies away and the other dies away.

The gramma is what forces us to doe, without which we would live without death, live on.

But all beings write; to exist is to write, texere, point a stylus and have in incise a surface whatever its making.

Ego iterato, ergo sum. Iter in Latin/itar in Sanskrit.

All roads lead to Rome?

No, those roads of gramma‘s making go everywhere but Rome¾and one can be very precise in this; such one can know.

The road itself is a gramma, and therefore iterable.

And it makes of earth a sheet of paper, a biblios, upon which it inscribes itself, disseminatively, virally.

Speeding up the gramma we grammachinized beings, and especially homo iteratiens, have tried to specialize the workings of the grammaverse.

That is to say, neutralize, make it neuter, the medium where homo iteratiens breaks through with supposedly objective science.

Here is where Virilio and Derrida meet.

Absolute rest or absolute speed¾that is how homo iteratiens imposes monarchy upon disseminative life.

The two are actually the same, and impossible, what defines the impossible.

What is aimed for relative speed, absolute speed, is specializing general iterability.

For science to obtain its goals it must restrict the disseminative and différancing effects and workings of general iterability; of utmost urgent import, in fact: the very sine qua non of science.

So much has it acknowledged this¾on various planes and according to shifting criteria¾that science have tried to substitute mathematics for language, and relies no longer so much upon the scientific researcher as the apparatuses measuring the experiments.

All reminiscent of writing¾and grammatology certainly is not exhausted by mere theories and hypotheses¾must be confined, specialized, laboratorized to ensure its communication without reserve.

Science is in this respect entirely within the Hegelian scheme, no matter what seizures have happened by way of, say, Heisenberg, Bohr, or Einstein.

The ideal is communication without reserve.

From this is opened an access to perfect communications between homo iteratiens and phusis.

But all of history of science demonstrates the futility of such an ideal.

Science has tried a variety of strategies; it needs to condemn writing no less than did Plato and philosophy generally.

What is demonstrated, however, is a certain Nothing, a nothing coming into being with real efficiency, a thanatology perhaps, conditioning such a history in general.

The semantics of the nothing is a clever fix.

One assumes that all is, and that all that is always is; being is always full and saturated: why one creates the no-thing.

Nothing is not something to care about; it is not.

Now, why are we so eager to assume that being is full and saturated, and that all that is not such full and saturated, such substantialized, is thereby properly no-thing, nonexistent, nothing to care about.

What, now, if instead what we term ingeniously ‘nothing’ are in being, making being not so full and saturated, making being porous?

That’s the question.

Pores of being, traces of, precisely, nothing; however, not voids in being, the void being the function allowing atoms to move and aggregate.

Like the one trace of nothing Husserl admits of existing between the transcendental and empirico-psychological ego.

Without the nothing, no history.

History moves by Heraclitean clinamens.

However a little something would constitute a centre around which everything else would revolve.

But there is no such thing as a thing, even how much the totem, the prayer, the experiment simulates that there is such, a thingicity. Substrates and inscription, in nature or man, changes nothing of this.

Two nothings then, the one hiding the other; one colloquial, useful and unavoidable as it is, and one secret, repressed.

Which is the metaphor of the other?

What would reciprocal metaphoricity imply and effectuate?

Being as presence, then.

That a thing to be, it is at its fullest in its present modality, singular indicative third person, all other modalities being just that: modalities, ontological modifications, derivative of the presency of the present.

And so whatever is not reducible either to the precency of present, or to its derivatives, its more shadowy and bleak versions, is hijacked by a anxiously built conception of the nothing, where the cipher itself is all of a sudden voided, nilled, emptied out, drained, ex-valued.

Third person singular indicative is totalitarianism in linguistics.

The same goes for its mathematical twin, that other cipher that created such furore upon its entrance in Medieval Europe.

Curiously a nothing is built that only too easy affirms the heterovorous Being.

A word without reference, still so pivotal to language and discourse.

But whence the need for a term without reference?

The exception that proves the rule? From where? 1631, it is said.

The will to power reveals to be a will to destruct, including auto-destruct.

Only such can explain the curious fact by which homo iteratiens so insistent and systematically ruins its own ground; it is its radicalism.

Paper machine, 156, hapto. Intuitionism, senses: scattered senses, their various “khoras,” the endeavour to attune them to each other as consolidatory machines, instruments: the sensed is what we manifoldly senses, one says. But rather the senses speak only and nothing but different worlds; there are as many worlds as there are senses. And there is not a given key as to how to have the different sense-worlds communicate, etc. Experience is properly a via rupta. It never was a road or a trail to begin with. And thus neither order nor disorder.

Derrida, in Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles:

The question of style is always the examination, the weighing-in of a pointed object. Sometimes it is only a feather, a quill; but it may also be a stylet, or even a dagger. Objects with which one can, to be sure, launch a vicious attack on what philosophy calls matter or matrix so as to thrust a mark upon it, leave an imprint or a form upon it; but also to repel a menacing form, to keep it at a distance, to repress it and guard against it¾while folding back or withdrawing, in flight, behind veils and sails [voiles]. […] Thus the style would jut out, like a spur [éperon], for example the ram of a sailing ship, the rostrum or prong that surges ahead to meet the attack and cleave the opposing surface. Or yet again, still in the nautical sense, the point of rock that is also called a spur and that “breaks up the waves at the entrance to the harbor.”

With its spur, then, style can also protect against the terrifying, blinding, mortal threat (of that) which presents itself, which obstinately makes itself seen: presence, the content, the thing itself, meaning, truth¾unless this is already the abyss deflowered in all this unveiling of difference. Already: the name of that which is effaced or subtracted beforehand, yet which leaves a mark, a subtracted signature on the very thing from which it withdraws¾the here and now. It must be taken into account, which I will do; but the operation can be neither simple nor brought to a point in a single blow. (S, Distances)

1

Ubiquitous computing:

This paradigm is also described as pervasive computing, ambient intelligence, or, more recently, everyware. When primarily concerning the objects involved, it is also physical computing, the Internet of Things, haptic computing, and things that think. Rather than propose a single definition for ubiquitous computing and for these related terms, a taxonomy of properties for ubiquitous computing has been proposed, from which different kinds or flavours of ubiquitous systems and applications can be described.


[1] Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1993).

[2] Une Pensée finie, 1990 Editions Galilée, ed. Simon Sparks, ”Originary Ethics,” in A Finite Thought, 2003 Stanford University Press, p. 175.

[3] Heidegger, op. cit., 152.

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