De rien: Silesius, Eckhart, and the Desire of Nothing




Silesius’ dictum: “To become Nothing is to become God” (Post-Scriptum: Aporias, Ways and Voices,” 289).

Meister Eckhart had already had written: “Who are they who are thus equal? Those who are equal to nothing, they alone are equal to God. The divine being is equal to nothing.”

And as for John of the Cross? What was his “path of Mount Carmel”? It consists of 7 steps: “Nothing, nothing, nothing, nothing, nothing, nothing, and even on the Mount nothing.”

Mechthild von Magdeburg wrote: “You must love the nothing [das niht] and flee the something [das iht].”

Quantum mechanics contends now that our universe came out of nothing, that the something can only be explained iff it all started with the nothing.



(In “Circumfession” Derrida gives us to know that Elijah is his second given name, one that for so many years remained “hidden,” “secret,” since it was not inscribed in public documents, since he only very late learned that it was his name (pp. 81, 95).)



We should, such befalls us, explore the relation between mysticism, especially in the form of negative theology, and modern science, in the trace left by Elisabeth Weber’s eminent “Elijahs Futures” (henceforth EF). And we will. Articulating the desire of nothing, which is to say the desire to desire nothing, the desire to become nothing, thus to become nothing’s desire, such is the mystical language, a language at the very limits, or margins, of language, that only will be an “inexhaustible exhaustion.” For the very same reason, this language would be “above all the most thinking, the most exacting, the most intractable experience of the ‘essence’ of language: a discourse on language . . . in which language and tongue speak of themselves and take note of this, that Die Sprache sprict” (Post-Scriptum: Aporias, Ways and Voice, 299 (PS)).

How, in language, by language, with language, experience—and we shall come back to what the term ‘experience’ signifies—to experience, re-perience, a language that “languages”? A voice that voices? A nothing that nothings? There are two ways: mysticism, and science.

In any case, negative theology would be nothing, very simply nothing, if this excess or this surplus (with regard to language) did not imprint some mark on some singular events of language and did not leave some remains on the body of a tongue. . . .

—A corpus, in sum.

—Some trace remains right in this corpus, becomes . . . [the] survivance of an internal ontologicosemantic auto-destruction: there will have been absolute rarefaction, the desert will have taken place, nothing will have taken place but this place. . . . “God” is the name of this bottomless collapse, of this endless desertification of language. But the trace of this negative operation is inscribed in and on and as the event. (PS, 300)

The locality of the word is empty. Figuration depends upon the spatiality of the pure space, the opening as such. A writing is always a writing upon nothing, and I allow myself to articulate a neograph eager to graft itself onto our era: ni-graphy. The nothing is what opens up the empty place, what gives an opening, offers a giving of the very figuration of language in general. Language will thus openly expose its own desire, impatient with the demarcations of its own topoi, expose its ordering us to go where one cannot go. Whence Derrida’s expression: “towards the beyond-the-name in the name”?

To go where it is possible to go would not be a displacement or a decision, it would be the irresponsible unfolding of a program. The sole decision possible passes through the madness of the undecidable and the impossible: to go where (wo, Ort, Wort) it is impossible to go” (PS, 302).

Metonyms: God, desire, desert, nothing. If the discursive possibilities of the via negativa is exhausted, if we thus come after the fact, après le fait, après-coup, a Nachträglichkeit, this event of the via negativa still remains to be thought, and to be thought “within the conditions of our present world” (EF, 207). How to think the desertification of language within our aridly technoscientific era, this “the poorest, most arid, in effect the most desert-like technoscientificity” (PS, 318)? This arid discourse has, to wit, become the universal tongue.



Elisabeth Weber here introduces Jacques Lacan into her discourse. Lacan describes the discourse of modern science, “the kind that was born with Galileo”—and here Jacques Lacan echoes a certain Edmund Husserl’s claim concerning the immense mathematization of nature that the proper name ‘Galileo’ in this context represents— namely in terms of the “increasing power of symbolic mastery [that] has not stopped enlarging its field of operation since Galileo, has not stopped consuming around it any reference that would limit its scope to intuited data” (Ethics of Psychoanalysis (EE), 122). By “allowing free reign to the play of the signifiers (EE, 122), it has produced a science for which “the vault of the heavens no longer exists, and all the celestial bodies, which are the best reference point there, appears as if they could just as well not be there.”

In passing, we must beware ourselves that according to Jacques Lacan psychoanalysis is possible solely in

  1. a culture that sanctions free reign to the signifier, in a culture that thus under the title of its highest achievements deals with what could fail to be where it is or what could fail to be as it is;
  2. the aftermath of the breakthrough of science in the ‘century of genius,’ to wit the seventeenth;
  3. a Judeo-Christian tradition that has broken with Aristotle, since such is requisite for proper scientific culture to emerge and institute.

As Jacques Lacan states: “Il n’y a pas de science de l’homme, parce que l’homme de la science n’existe pas, mais seulement son sujet.” / “There is no science of man, since the man of science does not exist, but only its subject” (ST, 8). The Freudian unconscious is only possible in a science where man is no longer, and where man now has become a subject of science, a mathematized science that that deals with what could fail to be where it is or what could fail to be as it is. Jacques Lacan says this without trace of nostalgia; psychoanalysis cannot be thought of outside of the parameters of modern science. “The subject of science is the subject of psychoanalysis, the subject of the signifier” (EF, 209). Man as subject of and to science is situated at the very nexus of difference in general, but also in the very heart of the specific difference between modern science and what passed for being science before the former emerged. In passing, thus.

Now, Lacan refers to Alexandre Koyré’s analysis of the “destruction of the cosmos” accomplished by Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton, accomplished by way of the unification of terrestrial and heavenly bodies. This destruction resulted in a complementary “geometrization of space,” leading straight into the mathematization of nature and science (Alexandre Koyré, quoted in H. Floris Cohen, The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry (SR), 80).

Alexandre Koyré writes: “modern science broke down the barriers that separated the heavens and the earth. … It did this by substituting for our world of quality and sense perception, the world in which we live, and love, and die, another world—the world of quantity, of reified geometry, a world in which, though there is place for everything, there is no place for man (SR, 87)” What is, then, according to Jacques Lacan, the function of this revolution, what is its effective history, what is it in the process of actualizing?

Via this immense revolution,

we see revealed for the first time the power of the signifier as such. That question is our very own. […] The sudden, prodigious development of the power of the signifier, of the discourse that emerged from the little letters of mathematics and that is distinct from all previously existing discourses, becomes an additional alienation […] insofar as it is a discourse that by reason of its structure forgets nothing. […] At a certain moment in time, man learned to emit and place the discourse of mathematics into circulation, in the real as well as in the world, and that discourse cannot function unless  nothing is forgotten. It only takes a little signifying chain to begin to function based on this principle, for things to move forward as if they were functioning by themselves. So much so that we even wonder if the discourse of physics, as engendered by the omnipotence of the signifier, will reach the point of the integration of nature or its disintegration. (EE, 236)

“The point of the integration of nature or its disintegration.” This will be our point from which we shall proceed. Not because it is evident, still less that it was for Lacan; in fact, it is remarkable that Lacan, already here, opens up the possibility of this un-heard of scandal: the disintegration of nature by means of science. Not because it is evident, then, but because it befalls us to an ever higher degree as it certainly is the case that signs of disintegration seem to accentuate and reveal the true significance of this very dry, arid era of the growing desert of technoscience.

The discourse of science forgets nothing. Which also means that it forgets the nothing. According to Jacques Lacan, this forgetting of the nothing in the onerous attempt of scientifically forgetting nothing, this is, precisely, the “fundamental omission in which the subject is situated” (EE, 236). Coming from the peripeties, science soon forgets the circuitous path by which it came into being; man, transformed in the nascence of science into the subject of science, finds himself as the allotropic placeholder for a certain fundamental omission, and the free reign of the inflationary dissemination of the signifier is limitless, limitless to the point of either integrating or disintegrating nature. The perfectly arbitrary character of human language, it being formal and différantial with no positive terms, suggests that its free and systematic installment within nature will, indeed, unleash catastrophe. We will later have to define what here is meant by ‘catastrophe.’



But let us read Elisabeth Weber. She will rivet the reader onto Blaise Pascal by way of Friedrich Kittler and Jacques Lacan. According to Kittler, one inherent implication of the subject being in the very nexus of difference, or différance, is the shift from determinism to probability. The signifier cut loose, there will be only probabilism left. Friedrich Kittler writes: “No one had ever dreamed of applying what Blaise Pascal called the geometry of chance in order to describe the physical world, because this world was not supposed to be and operate just like a game of chance” (Lacan: Encore, manuscript, 4). In his lecture “Psychoanalysis and Cybernetics,” Jacques Lacan wrote of the substitution of a “science of the combination of places as such” for the “science of what is found at the same place.” Jacques Lacan will in his lecture “Psychoanalysis and Cybernetics” focus the substitution of the “science of what is find at the same place” for the “science of the combination of places as such,” explicitly referring to game theory:

I’ve told you how the entire movement of the theory converges on a binary symbol, on the fact that anything can be written in terms of 0 and 1. What else is needed before what we call cybernetics can appear in the world? It has to function in the real, independently of any subjectivity. This science of empty places, of encounters in and of themselves has to be combined, has to be totalized and has to start functioning all by itself. (300)


The little symbolic game in which Newton’s system and that of Einstein is summed up has in the end very little to do with the real. The science which reduces the real to several little letters, to a little bundle of formulae, will probably seem, with the hindsight of later epochs, like an amazing epic, and will also dwindle down, like an epic, to a rather short circuit.

Now, Weber asks if a science modeled upon pure combinatorics of empty places irrespective of the real world has forgotten something. Meister Eckhart maintains that the best for is to seek stillness, and be there as long as possible. This is because God abhors the vacuum, the empty. “As and when God finds you ready, He has to act, to overflow into you, just as when the air is clear and pure the sun has to burst forth and cannot refrain.” “If there were anything empty under heaven, whatever it might be, great or small, the heavens would either draw it up to themselves or else, bending down, would have to fill it with themselves. God, the master of nature, will not tolerate any empty place. Therefore, stand still and do not waver from your emptiness.” Thus one can force God to enter; one empties oneself, one “nothings” oneself. God can but fill whatever should open empty.

As for Lacan this emptiness resides in the fact of man being inscribed into the signifying chain. Language is nothing. Reading Heidegger’s mentioned analysis Lacan will claim that the vase is the signifier in paragon. Lacan: “It creates the void and thereby introduces the possibility of filling it. Emptiness and fullness are introduced into a world that by itself knows not of them” (). In fact, the signifier introduces a whole or a gap in the real (EE, 121). Against Aristotle, for whom all things are made exclusively of matter, Lacan, with Heidegger, contend that the potter in his pursuit of the pure void creates ex nihilo, creates the vase “around” nothingness, assuming the latter to be the starting point from which later to mold matter and nature. We do see the affinity between mystical discourse and modern science, several traces non of which are fortuitous.



This revolution, this revolution of organizing things around nothingness, as epitomized first in the vase, is in my view the first clearly articulated sign of inversalization, the physical aspects of which are today as terrifying as they are salient. Being is in the process of being inversalized: matter inversed, made nothing. Spatial colonizing, then temporal colonizing, to the point where the organizing of nothing requires us undermining the conditions of futurity in general.

The container implicates the void and nil. The vase, as already Heidegger analyzed it in “Das Dinge,” is implicated in contemporary binaries, cybernetics, and quantum-mechanical empty space the latter for which the amount of energy in the universe is exactly: zero. For the systematization of binaries and the driest and most economic form of formalization to be actualized and to take hold on science, the vase had first to emerge; to make room for itself, to open itself up, first something like the primitive forming matter around a certain nothing was requisite. It was requisite that the organization of nothing started somewhere, and the beholder was thus a primordial conceptual phase of what now unfolds as cybernetics.

Asking what modern science necessarily forgets about, Weber answers that it is this very non-place, this pure spatiality, that modern science has to forget, even “foreclose”—which translates Freud’s Verwerfung—, as it does by attempting to “suture” the subject. The gap in the subject, the rent in the symbolic, the nothing in the chain of the signifier, must be sutured. The Lacanian subject, we must keep in mind, is that which is “represented by a signifier for another signifier” and thus a pure effect of language. Lacan’s stance not being anti-scientific, one must try to understand that “[l]e sujet en question reste le corrélat de la science, mais un corrélat antinomique puisque la science s’avère définie par la non-issue de l’effort pour le suturer” (SV, 877). In Alexandre Leupin’s words, for Lacan, “[t]here is a hole in the field of science that prevents its rational unification. […] This linking of the impossibility of scientific suture and the incompleteness of truth is Lacan’s main contribution to epistemology” (Lacan and the Human Sciences, Introduction, 7).

Lacan will contend that such foreclosure implicates the exclusion of something that will have to return from without as real, as is exemplified in psychotic hallucinations, for example. This exclusion from the subject “constitutes the real as the domain that subsists outside of symbolization” (Écrits, 388). Verwerfung cuts off every manifestation of the symbolic order. It cuts off the primordial Bejahung, or affirmation, that Bejahung that Freud posits as a necessary precedent for any Verneinung, negation, this latter taken as the privileged access to what is repressed, verdrängt. Speaking with Franz Rosenzweig as he pays homage to the scholar of psychoanalysis and mysticism Michel de Certeau, foreclosure would entail severing “the Ja, the Yes, as the original Word (Urwort) that opens language and thereby exceeds it” (“On the Possible Treatment of Psychosis,” in Écrits: A Selection, 200-1″). Verwerfung differs from repression in that it leaves no traces from which future symbolization could be structured. Verwerfung leaves a hole, an abyss in the symbolic, or, as Samuel Weber puts it, “a rent in the Symbolical” (“Introduction to the 1988 Edition,” xlv).

If, as Lacan contends, primordial affirmation bears on the signifier, then foreclosure is foremost a foreclosure of the signifier; foreclosure cuts off the opening towards being.  Now, it is this very ‘opening towards being’ that science tends to foreclose. At which point it actually reveals something of this fundamental openness: as we wonder whether science will bring forth integration or disintegration of nature, we find “the revelation of the decisive and original character of the place where human desire is situated in the relationship of man to the signifier,” upon which he asks, “should this relationship be destroyed?” (EE, 236). And I quote:

It is because the movement of desire is in the process of crossing the line of a kind of unveiling that the advent of the Freudian notion of the death drive is meaningful for us. … It is a question for the here and now, and not ad eaternum. … The question is raised at the level of relationship of the human being to the signifier as such, to the extent that at the level of the signifier every cycle of being may be called into question, including life in its movement of loss and return. (EE, 236)

Earlier Lacan had expressed: “[I]n the end what is expressed for us in the energy/matter equivalence is that one final day we may find that the whole texture of appearance has been rent apart, starting from the gap we have introduced there; the whole thing might just disappear” (EE, 122). This is no insane apocalyptic fantasy, but a destruction of which no trace would be left; we have known this ever since the first atom bomb explosion, what Lacan, in 1959, refers to as “the absolute weapon” (EE, 104). Science occupies desire, that is to say, not a specific place, but the pure and empty place, the nothing, introduced by the signifier. This nothing that the signifier introduces into the real, this gap of pure spatiality, opens up space for the metonymy of desire. Foreclosure introduces a rent into the symbolical, the signifier introduces a nothing into being, a rent into being that tears the world apart, whose individualized instantiation would be the subject torn into psychotic hallucinations. The rent in the symbol and the rent in the real have substantial physical effects.



We must here take a detour so as to link this discourse reproduced and articulated by Weber to our one concerns in the present. I will only make mention of a few developments, in line with the overall argument of Weber, with a view of making this discourse on the affinity between the arid, desert-like mysticism and modern science also a deeply committing concern in our own times.


Shiva greets you at the entrance of the LHC complex


If Lacan, in 1959, refers to the atomic bomb as “the ultimate weapon,” he knew nothing of what so soon after would come. What would he not have said today? There are three aspects, all of which confirms Lacan’s discourse here, to take note of:

  1. Mass destruction nuclear bombs have since multiplied, intensified, even beyond state control: uncontrolled dissemination of ever increasing destruction potentials.
  2. 50 years later Organisation Européenne pour la Recherche Nucléaire/European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) has built a quark factory, or a quark canon—CERN’s Large Hadron Collider (LHC)—able to produce, according to some scientists, a ‘mass bomb.’
  3. Aside of all kinds of bombs, considered as more and more powerful emblems of the virtual nothing actualizing itself inside being, we now also have manufactured an all the more stealthy and all the more torturous and sure ecodestruction whose effectuant is the very normal functioning of science for civic purposes. Micro, meso, macro: everywhere we see a steady desolation, generalizing and globalizing, ecodestructions an increasing number of which are irreversible. In the degree to which ecodestructive effects at all are acknowledged, they will be foreclosed, and disappear as mere eventual and derivative ‘seide-effects.’

As for the second point, let us try explicate some of those fundamental traits that immediately finds itself in vicinity to this discourse of mysticism and modern science. Now, one of CERN’s explicit goals is to produce 1 micro black hole/second, manufacturing micro black holes, then, as stated by various CERN officials/scientists and its director Dr. Engelen. Such manufacturing, such smashing of the thing into smithereens, is, according to the newest ‘Supersymmetry Theory,’ a necessary implication towards reproducing conditions as were when the universe was less than a billionth of a second old. One wants to reproduce 13.8 billion years old phenomena, because only this gives us access to the ultimate, ulterior truth: the Grand Unified Theory of Everything, such as is in fact stated, nothing less.

Homo sapiens, as if hard-wired to smash things, from the flint axe on, here, with the gigantic LHC, sees its chance to catch up with what (supposedly) started the whole thing, to become one with the origin of the all. If homo sapiens should thus obtain a total understanding of the very underpinnings and workings of the universe, it would a fortiori hold the key to cosmic intervention; it would be enabled, at this very moment of singularity, to take part, as cosmos evolves, in the processes of creation and destruction involved in the incessant unfolding of the cosmos. To merge itself with the very unfolding of the cosmos: homo sapiens qua God, as if God would emerge in the shape of homo sapiens. Or as if it, one day, usurped the role of God. God become homo sapiens. It would “win it all.” Or, such is the dominant conception, the conception that dominates the most prestigious research milieus and projects.

Animals of all sorts cutting and smashing things; with a view to still hunger and build nests and homes. In homo sapiens this process is as if short circuited; cutting things becomes its highest endeavor and vocation: the end of homo sapiens, in the double genitive, in both senses of ‘end.’ Homo sapiens inverts the original relation: no longer cutting to reproduce, it produce and reproduce to cut: homo graphiens. It has long been said that homo homini lupus, that man is wold to man; it could appear, however, that homo natura lupis would be far more accurate. The truth, one supposes, lies in utter, extreme violence towards the thing, thingicity itself. Massive destruction as means to obtain and hold ‘truth,’ and to ‘intervene.’ For comparison: the particle accelerators used back in the 30s to research the first atomic bomb produced energies a billionth of what the LHC deploys.

It is hypothesized that colliding billions upon billions of hadrons in approximately the speed of light (99.99999%) will reproduce conditions that only obtained at the instant of the Creation, the ‘Big Bang,’ of the universe 13.8 billion years ago. It is known that ultraviolent collisions, at such speeds involving extreme energies, happen all the time, at different scales, throughout the cosmos. But inside our own planet, in a 27 kilometer circumference tunnel 100 meters under ground?

The LHC produces collisions, at a rate of 800 billions/sec, involving enormous amounts of kinetic energy. The scientific goal is to produce new types of particles, revealing new dimensions. The process that the LHC engages in, is thus the inverse of Einstein’s formula ‘E=Mc2’: the LHC will be creating mass from energy, ‘M=E/c2.’ In these experiments are created temperatures of 10 million billion Celsius, that is to say a million times hotter than the centre of the sun, making it one of the hottest places in the entire universe. And a vacuum emptier than outer space; everything possible sucked out. Utter emptiness, nil. In the “milieu” of this utter emptiness, at degrees approximately those of absolute zero, to wit 271 C, the LHC will collide hadrons at speeds approximately those of light, a process in which energies and heat is created that are totally unknown to earth, the result of which is, of course, uncertain.

The Supersymmetry Theory employed hypothesizes that the LHC experiment will evidence what gives particles and atoms mass. The Supersymmetry Theory contends that the Standard Model is ‘sick,’ and that it needs ‘repairing.’ The Standard Model, now, is generally held to explain ‘everything.’ Everything, except one crucial thing that somehow got missed out: mass. The Standard Model can’t explain why it is that things have mass, what ‘mechanism’ it is that gives atoms their mass, their ‘substance.’ The Supersymmetry Theory, whose origins lie more than 40 years back, proposes that there exists a ‘field’ through which some particles gain mass while still other “particles,” traveling at the speed of light, will not. This hypothesized field, named ‘Higg’s Field,’ contains, hypothetically, certain mass-endowing particles, named ‘Higg’s bosons.’

But being of 40 years of age, this theory is nonetheless not evidenced in any measure. We should remind ourselves that to this very date there is no experimental evidence for the existence of such a field and such mass-endowing particles; the Supersymmetry Theory is, therefore, a pure hypothesis in its purely fictional state. One proceeds to install a certain theoretical, purely hypothetical, something to repair the lack of another widely evidenced and practicable theory. Then the proponents of the Supersymmetry Theory contends, with the utmost conviction, that if anything can affirm or corroborate, or alternatively falsify their theory, it is this LHC. Proponents even contend that irrespective of their theory being corroborated or straight-out falsified, the LHC will anyhow reveal the originary particles that give things mass. LHC is hypostatized as a machine of absolute truth and absolute revelation.

All atoms consist of two types of quarks: up-quarks and down-quarks. The LHC, however, risks manufacturing new forms of particles, some of which would be the strange quarks, or strangelets, and these have never before existed on earth. At CERN they do have strangelet detectors. Some more orthodox Standard Model theorists has it that if large enough quanta of these three types of quarks combine, they will come into existence and form atoms far more stable and heavy than iron atoms, these iron atoms being our planet’s most stable and heavy atoms (why they consolidate in the very inner kernel of our planet). Stabler and heavier atoms attract less stable and heavier atoms. According to the Standard Theory, the ultra-dangerous, ultra-dense ‘strangelets’, the liquid explosive made of up-, down- and strange-quarks, is responsible for the ‘ice-9 reactions’ that cause supernovas. Dr. Wilczek, the Nobel Prize laureate, discovered and named the ice-9 reaction. Game theory, quantum roulette?

As far as concerns CERNs theoretical underpinnings, this smashing the thing into smithereens in the speed of light, constitutes the only means to prove their theory right. One will create matter, matter that never before has existed on earth. The religious fervor at CERN is reported to be impeccable. And the symbols used follow up promptly, such as the Shiva statue that guards the entrance to the LHC. Scientists at CERN informs that something may come through “dimensional doors.”  “Out of this door might come something, or we might send something through it,” says Sergio Bertolucci, who is Director for Research and Scientific Computing at CERN.



Other physicists, however, contend that today’s Standard Model (which is Einstein’s Relativity Theory in all themes concerned with mass) explains how a mass bomb of heavy quarks, which hold 99% of the mass of the Universe (M), suck in and glue light matter (our matter, E), at light speed (c2), causing a Nova or Supernova explosion that could convert Earth into an ultra-dense, massive object: either a small neutron star (reducing our earth to a strange lump of matter the size of a football field), or a black hole. We could end up with either a hyper-dense object, or just a black zero. The game is binary.

Einstein’s original formula of 1905 concerned the formation of mass, M=E/c2. The reverse formula, E=Mc2, gained popularity only after Hiroshima. The formula that provided for the production of the atomic bomb was thus a simple inversion of the original formula of the mass bomb. Hiroshima thus proved both formula to be true; considering the fact that E=Mc2 was deduced from M=E/c2 and that the former was shown highly effective in Hiroshima, one must deduce that also the M=E/c2 is also true, since otherwise there would have been no Hiroshima. Such mass bombs occur constantly, in all scales, in the universe; without them the universe would die.

With the Large Hadron Collider science is replicating the workings of cosmos on a quantum scale: mass-bombs catalyze the absorption of our electronic world by quarks. Since the mass-bomb is the inverse of an atomic bomb, E=Mc2, its combustible is outside the bomb–it is, therefore, the mass of this planet or any celestial body. Thus, unlike atomic bombs that need the combustible inside the bomb, the only thing needed to create a mass-bomb is the detonator, i.e. ‘ice-9’ (strange quark liquid), since the combustible for a terrestrial mass bomb simply is the entire mass of the Earth. According to the Standard Theory such is the stake, that there is involved an ‘existential risk’ that should (in the strongest possible sense of the word) be acted upon before one commences these experiments; at CERN, however, they make use of rather speculative theories formulated by Hawking and Higgs, hyped by media and, according to the critics, never proved nor corroborated in any measure here adequate. As for Hawking, the manufacturing of these black holes could, provided his never before corroborated theories hold true, give us ‘Time Travel Machines.’ At CERN one happily imagines, as it is stated, creating holes and gaps in space-time. Such holes are imagined to suspend the workings of the 4 dimensions of spatio-temporaliy, and allow for, e.g., “time travel,” instant communication and transport across large time scales.

Reasonable demands as to have an independent committee evaluating the risks involved—risks deduced from the Standard Model that we in all other respects hold in a very high esteem—have again and again been overturned. Those concerned with this possibly catastrophic experiment only wants a fully independent committee (consisting not only of physicists, but also ethicists, statisticians, etc.) to assess the security and the risks involved; after all, the supersymmetrytheories are still controversial and hypothetical.However, the LHC Safety Assessment Group, a group consisting of CERN-affiliated scientists, mandated by CERN itself, indicates that “there is broad consensus among physicists on the reality of Hawking radiation, but so far no experiment has had the sensitivity required to find direct evidence for it.” (Ellis J, Giudice G, Mangano ML, Tkachev I, Wiedemann U, “Review of the Safety of LHC Collisions,” 2008).

What motivation lies behind CERN’s insistence on having its own, internally undertaken, risk assessment passed as the only authoritative assessment? And: how come such a strictly anti-scientific procedure is simply granted by state authorities, considering that it is paid by large business corporations and tax-payers from 20 countries? Why is even UN dismissing the appeal for a temporary halt? It is the most expensive research project in history, and those billions of euros simply can not be jeopardized. It seems that once the bet is placed, there is nothing that can change the game. And there is more to come: many physicists are convinced that physics has reached a stage that necessitates such and other perhaps even yet more extreme experiments if we are to get more answers as we dig further into existence.

Considering the size of the bet placed, what is committed to in terms of desire, that is to say usurping a function as godlike agents steering and commanding things and processes in cosmos, there is no wonder that the proponents exhibit religious, ecstatic fervor. But for earth, for all living and non-living things, one is all of a sudden—irreversibly since all claims to investigating into matters of security and risk honoring the otherwise universally required and granted procedures and criteria of scientific credibility, these experiments are routinely turned down—put out as an all-or-nothing bet. If the speculative theory turns out quite right, homo sapiens has gained what is claimed to be an absolute gain of knowledge about who we are, what we are, what and where we came from, etc., all very old philosophical questions; if it turns out to be head-on wrong—and even the quickest and most superficial skimming of the history of science tells us, precisely, that science has always been, without exception, wrong—this game will end in absolute existential annihilation. The situation is not bettered by the fact that there are theories that actually explains what can go wrong and why it can go wrong. The situation is not bettered, either, by a media that somehow is in unanimous agreement: proponents are right, opponents crazy. That this game involves a logic of all or nothing have many a time been affirmed, often with a certain perverse sense of humor: “If we are wrong, who will be left to tell us?”



When the god of writing, Thoth, our god, gave us writing, what seems to have been destined was mysticism, the via negativa, technoscience, and smashing hadrons in speeds approximately those of light with a risk—what percentage is difficult if not impossible since the theory employed is still just that: theory, hypothesis with no empirical back-up whatsoever—of producing matter anti-thetic to our existence.

CERN states:

There are theories that suggest that the matter particles we are made of cannot propagate on the extra dimensions. In these theories, the only way to detect the extra dimensions is by using gravitational interactions. The strength of gravity in the 5-dimensional (or higher-dimensional) description is much more intense than in four dimensions, hence we predict the possibility of creating black holes in collisions in the LHC. These events would be spectacular, with the black hole decaying almost immediately into a shower of many particles, and would allow us to test the properties of quantum gravity in accelerators. In any of these two possible scenarios, the detection of the existence of extra dimensions would be an unprecedented discovery, and an astonishing insight into the nature of the Universe [m.b.].



Lacan has it that science is defined in terms of the “dead-locked endeavor to suture the subject” (ST, 10). Science endeavors to suture the subject, that is to say neglects the subject, because the “speaking subject is considered irrelevant to the field” (Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance, pp. 139-40). Linked to this neglect is the neglect of ‘truth as cause.’ This cause is the cause of desire, and this is what science foreclosures through the neglect and exclusion of the subject. As Weber writes: “This cause—which simultaneously determines and decenters the subject, introducing into it an unbridgeable “gap,” the space of nothingness—cannot be taken into account by the discourse of the modern sciences. But science is nonetheless deeply—and structurally—haunted by it” (EF, 213). Against Heidegger’s “Die Wissenschafte denkt nicht,” despite the fact that Ethics of Psychoanalysis is heavily indebted to Heidegger, Lacan will contend that science does indeed think. More than its sutured subjects, “since it carries its secret host—to which it offers refuge—desire to its very limits. Desire is realized today in the form of modern physics, which, “determined” by the foreclosure of desire’s cause, the foreclosure of nothing, approaches this “nothing” literally “going great guns” (ibid., 214). For “what is foreclosed in the symbolic reappears in the real” (EE, 235). Let us pause, and meditate these last few thoughts.

One can only with acutely uneasy incredulity watch the unfathomable naivety expressed amongst practitioners of modern high tech science. Vanished is any trace of the problem horizon that, nonetheless, so obviously is integral to the very undertakings of that same science. Whither the heralded and long-time honored scientific doubt? Conversely, these practitioners express shocked disbelief towards any doubts and any problematization of their work, mocking critics and concerned, in fact vilifying these latter, supported by an all too complacent media. Appropriating a position of absolutism, they announce that if science is to progress further at all, machines like the Large Hadron Collider is from now on its very sine qua non.

As one will guess, they will never refrain from “advancing,” science and knowledge, and rightly so of course. But are these scientists—more than 7900 scientists and engineers, about half the global particle physics community, work on these experiments conducted at CERN—not already violating a certain key criteria of scientificity? An internally instituted committee for inquiring into the possible risks of the research in question can never confer credibility to the results of this inquiring; procedures of validation and control need be conducted by independent agents, that is to say agents with no affiliation with the research to be undertaken.

One must ask why it is that CERN, supported and sanctioned by 20 countries, big corporations, and UN, will not allow a risk assessment that is undertaken openly and by independent agents. This project of CERN being arguably the biggest and most prestigious experiment of science ever undertaken, why not from the outset secure credibility and hability, even how ridiculous the concerns raised appear to CERN? There is only one possible explanation: CERN knows that an independent assessment of the risks involved in their experiments would be addressed; after all, it is only a para-empirical theory that supports CERN’s claims to non-risk. For instance, the Hawking Radiation says that any arising black holes will evaporate in femtoseconds, or emit radiation, which is to say not enough time to accrete mass or cause problems: at the outset a very comforting thought. The problem, however, is that this, needless to say, has never been proven. It is a calculation obeying the rules of game a priori established by the underlying purely hypothetical theory.

Now, if it is ventured that only machineries like the LHC can possibly provide further experimental and empirical corroboration of theories of particle physics, it is implied that machines like the Large Hadron Collider is only the beginning. It is enthusiastically declared that this science is in such a state, at such a level, that whatever theories and hypotheses are propagated these can only be falsified or corroborated by means of ever more violent smashing to smithereens of ever smaller constituents of nature, thus involving ever higher temperatures, speeds, energies, that produce new forms of mass, matter, particles, quarks—here on earth, never before seen on earth. Needless to say, there is no experiential evidence and experience with such non-terrestrial forms of mass and matter; speculative theories, therefore, bear the burden, the impossible burden I should hasten to say, of ruling out any catastrophic consequences of mixing terrestrial with non-terrestrial.

Besides, as concerns possible threats and risks they smilingly reassure the public pointing to devices that supposedly will catch up to any imaginable fault or failure. So for instance, there is a strangelet detector at LHC, even if for a long time the leadership at CERN denied even the slightest possibility of strangelets being produced. And CERN loves making jokes: if all goes wrong, no one will be around to prove them wrong; in other words, they have got it right in either way. From my point of view, which is that of a certain virographematics, such behavior is extremely worrying. Let me try to explain:

It seems these practitioners of this high tech science are not able to ponder the implications of the simple fact that it is their own theories which form the very fundament upon which their instruments, machines, experiments, security devices, are based. Also, one can only wonder whether they have ever read history of science. The history of science is, to put it bluntly, a plenitude of wrong theories, of failures and flaws; what, precisely, makes science progress. Flaws constitutes the main engine of science. One can also only wonder whether they have ever taken notice what our current everyday, not so high tech, science is already unleashing upon our planet. Because if they had, they would presumably paused to think about, not only the sunny side of scientific progress and success—which is reserved for the stupefied—but also the ever growing series of ecodestructions, an increasing degree of which are irreversible, that follow in the very wake of mentioned science.



What is foreclosed in the symbolic reappears in the real, then. As seen in individual cases related to psychopathological phenomena, readily granted. As also granted socio-political phenomena. Why not for physical phenomena?

That is the question. What appears in the real as a result of foreclosure in modern natural science? Could it be that the same logic of foreclosure operating at the psyche and socius is no less applicable to the biological and physical phenomena? Surely a speculative hypothesis. In truth not, since there already exists enormous amounts of data, involving all registers of the micro, meso, and macro, empirically given and accessible to all, that more than indicates that there is something rotten in the state of science.

Unsurprisingly, there are theoretical resources—albeit so far not employed in this specific setting of ours here—that, combined with the available empirical data in question, in my opinion, would demonstrate as reasonable and even plausible the claim according to which the state of modern science de jure no less than de facto is fundamentally flawed. We do not here have the occasion of treating this in detail, but suffice it, for the purpose of this text, to say that anthropogenic ecodestructions as concerns, e.g., climate (macro), e.g., pollution and intoxication of water, soil, air, mass extinction of species (meso), e.g., genetic disturbances (micro), are already making a huge impact on every aspect of our lives, be it civic or military. This is foreclosed, no wonder. As is the existential danger of dissemination atomic bombs, mass bombs and quark canons. And so it is that it dominates us, it dominates us from our blind side, from what we thought was not even there. It will have to enter our existence, much as God can but fill a soul that empties itself; just as Eckhart advocated luring the new God of the Nothing into you by provoking emptiness inside, the provoking of the emptiest space possible inside the particle colliders will lure in small black holes that a non-corroborated theory has it will immediately radiate and evaporate.

I am not necessarily saying neither that the critics of CERN is correct, nor that CERN eventually will be creating a black hole that, contrary theoretical calculations, accretes enought matter to become stable and further its collapsing matter till nothing remains of earth—though, for obvious reasons, I would have no principal troubles defending the possible justification of such particular propositions were someone to propose them. But I do claim, positively, that necessarily there eventually will be an accident,’ a ‘side-effect,’ that will be of extreme discomfort, in proportion to the intensity of the research undertaken.

The logic is simple, and, I believe, as justifiable as it is plain for all to verify, to the point of being a tiresome cliché: the more we effectively intervenes in nature, the more effectively  we produce so-called ‘side-effects.’ It cannot really provoke any surprise that much as, e.g., nuclear research has already had its “accidents,” and that the ‘accidental potential’ of this research is far from exhausted, quark research is necessarily going to produce, within the very real, even more hazardous consequences. Especially so as half the worlds particle physicists appears to be unanimous in their verdict that their research pose no threat at all. Though the more detailed workings of such a logic is not described, I believe that in Derrida we find some crucial means towards understanding this perverse logic, this parasitological, viral logic. I coin the term ‘virographematics’ for the field in which such an understanding is to be articulated.

What is foreclosed in the natural science? If we grant the Lacanian premisses plausibility—and there can be no doubt that we should, at least as a hypothesis against which there are no substantial and decisive counter-arguments—we might say that what science forecloses is a certain desire, then, a desire that operates in its very heart and hearth, to wit the desire of nothing. Not just ‘desire of nothing,’  but a desire of nothing in its most ambiguous genitive, monstrously reappearing deformed by foreclosure.

When God died, as He did, on the cross, as told, written, and witnessed, as God literally died, when God became nothing, as further evidenced in the profound tale of the empty tomb of Jesus, nowhere to be found, Silesius and Eckhart became our new prophets. In the name of this Godhead they wrote of nothing. And prophesied its becoming, far beyond what they could possibly imagine, the real becoming of the nothing, its coming into the real, its taking the place of the real—thus far beyond its first rudimentary phenomenalizing as particular experiences of psychic phenomena. But sure it all starts there, in the heads, but sooner or later it is destined to disseminate and propagate wider, accreting more and more of a material character.

The empty tomb of God already signs what awaits us, the emblem of an entire epoch of thought that is still in evolution, in the material world as such. Desire is irreducibly inscribed upon a certain projected sheet of nothing, which makes a certain teratological nigraphy integral to it: nigraphy, the neither nor of the graphein in general. As science with all its might fights nigraphic effects, it is bound, in a schizophrenic double bind, to produce the inverse of what it forecloses. As, for instance, a generalizing and globalizing ecodestruction necessarily is produced by our best intentions of helping ourselves and even nature as such prosper. As when the very best of technoscience ends in utter dysfunctionality and material poverty, the hyped discoveries and technologies of which will never serve in the slightest degree to justify the present epoch of science at work.

I venture that one could rather easy demonstrate these two hypotheses:

  1. Never before have we been as poor, that is to say materially poor, not despite science’s explicit goal of the contrary but because of this.
  2. Never has science and technology been as dysfunctional, contrary the fact that these have never before in history been better equipped and motivated, as in the present. Again, not despite the fact that science and technology defines itself in terms of perfecting its functionality, but because of this endeavor.

CERN, the epitome of human endeavors, is a quark fabric, a fabric scheduled to manufacture one micro black hole each second. According to calculations made, it should pose no noticeable risk, an evaluation of which was made by CERN itself. Do we see what will appear from this yet another articulation of a foreclosure of a desire inscribed in nigraphy? What would be the inversalization of what is the explicit goal of CERN, that is to say to gain, once and for all, a ‘Theory of Everything’? Would it simply be that the supersymmetry theories would be proven false? I think not. It is bound to produce severe ‘material’ effects in the real, effects whose impact would perversely “exemplify” this absolutist theory of the very everything.

This is foreclosed by recourse to highly formalized symbol systems and appeals to the automatic character of instruments and machines; as of by recourse to these impersonal devices would preclude, in the most rational possible way, any irrationality, any desire. Now, what is this desire desire of? This desire is of the nothing. If this desire of nothing is foreclosed in the natural sciences, what could we expect to se come realized in the real? I’d say: what have we not already, for a very long time, seen coming realized in the most dreadful ways. Not fortuitously, even these plain and salient effects of science, relegated to the realm of the pseudo and the para, are foreclosed; they must not be there if science is to keep its steady course.

As you may have noted, we are already speaking with Paulo Virilio and his dromology of the accident, we contend that the ‘accident’ is integral to the product: the train also means train accidents, the pesticides also means intoxicating soil and water, airplanes and cars also means climate change, nuclear plants also means uncontrollable disseminating radioactivity; all these things being integral and just as necessary as the supposed intentionally produced ‘good’: the quark canon also means—what? What possibly could it mean? We should already be ready to acknowledge that it necessarily entails the coming of one or more accidents. As a general rule, one should contend, as this has been verified throughout history, that the scale of the accident is in direct proportion with the intentioned, supposedly good or useful, product. Now, I do not believe that Virilio has explicated the workings of this perverse logic; Derrida has, however. Even if he never got the occasion to highlight its workings within science. His project was one of sollicitating philosophy, demonstrating how it was possible, and how it was necessary; my project is one of sollicitating science. With Nietzsche and Derrida: our aim is “to tympanize—“ science!



We must continue our reading of Elisabeth Weber’s remarkable essay. Lacan writes in the 60s that the “massive destruction” that our history has witnessed “seems to us to be an inexplicable accident, a resurgence of savagery” (EE, 235), to which Walter Benjamin already in the 30s had answered to, reminding us that “the astonishment that the things we are experiencing are ‘still’ possible in the twentieth century is not philosophical. This amazement is not the beginning of knowledge—unless it is the knowledge that the view of history which gives rise to it is untenable” (Benjamin, Illuminations, 257). Weber explains:

The view of history that gives rise to such astonishment is untenable not only because it subscribes to the idea of the imperturbable advance of progress toward a better future but also because it ignores the fact that “the massive destruction” of our century is “necessarily linked to the leading edge of our discourse” (EE, 235), “our discourse” designating here the “discourse of the community, of the general good,” carrying in itself the effects of science (EE, 236). This discourse pursues in the real what is forecloosed, not repressed, in the symbolic. (EF, 214)

It is necessary now to have this text resonate with Derrida’s “No Apocalypse, Not Now.” As for the violent repression, in its psychoanalytical as well as political sense, ecclesiastic authorities exerted upon the mysticists, from the Crusades to the end of the thirteenth century, it changed character with the advent of the scientific revolution.  A geometrized universe could no longer integrate the mystic’s “exigency of the symbolic.” The desired self-abolition of the discourse of mysticism became readable in another light: a desire inhabited by the most radical finitude, read as the reiterated, irreducible, essential, infinite affirmation of finitude, of difference as such, of desire as such. Weber goes on to ask if not this new readability did not reveal the very limits of the mechanism of repression itself: “with the impossibility of integrating the signifier  of the mystics’ language into the new scientific order into the new scientific order, the “symbolizing compromise” or “symbolic mediation” constituted by repression revealed itself to be impossible, making this signifier’s foreclosure imperative” (EF, 215).

The self-abolition of discourse today is of another, albeit related, kind. If mysticism could be described as desire in the name of the name, desire of nothing in the name of the name, the scientific tendency towards the abolition of discourse “is a foreclosure of that desire and of its signifier—of the name of the name, the name in epitome” (EF, 215). Nonetheless is that tendency still an expression of a desire for the name. In “No Apocalypse, Not Now, ” Derrida writes: “The name of nuclear war is the name of the first war which can be fought in the name of the name alone, that is, of everything and of nothing” (NA, 30). Further:

This war would be waged in the name of something, whose name, in this logic of total destruction, can no longer be borne, transmitted, inherited by anything living, that name in the name of which war would take place would be the name of nothing, it would be the pure name, the “naked name.” We think now the nakedness of the name. That war could be the first and the last war in the name of the name, with only the non-name of “name.” It would be a war without a name, a nameless war, for it would no longer share even the name of war with other events of the same type, of the same family, these small, finished wars whose memory and monuments we guard. Beyond all genealogy, a nameless war in the name of the name. That would be the End and the Revelation of the name itself, the Apocalypse of the Name. Now: End and Revelation of the Name. This is the Apocalypse: Name. This is: strange present, now. We are there. In a certain way we have always been, and we think it, even if we don’t know it. But we are not there yet, not now. (NA, 384-5)

Which is to say that we have always been there in the nothing of the name, but whose knowledge, whose experience has been systematically repressed. “For it is impossible to be in nothing, impossible to be in the purity of desire, given that pure desire is nothing other than “the pure and simple desire of death as such” (EE, 282).” (EF, 216.) The foreclosure of that pure spatiality is our question today; today it is readable, for us. If breaking the mirror would be, through an act of language, nuclear war, we have to face Derrida’s question:

Who can swear that our unconscious is not expecting this? dreaming of it, desiring it? […] The hypothesis of this total destruction watches over deconstruction, it guides its footsteps; it becomes possible to recognize, in the light, so to speak, of that hypothesis, of that fantasy, or phantasm, the characteristic structures and historicity of the discourses, strategies, texts, or institutions to be deconstructed (NA, 23/27). (M.b.)

When the day comes where we see realized, in very practical terms, what exactly lies at the heart of desire, we will see desire as an explosive element “whose interpretations decide on the mere possibility of the future” (EF, 216). Have we not already seen the dawn of this question of the futuricity in general? The first atomic bombs signaled what was to come; their uncontrollable dissemination and multiplication, the information bomb, the quark canon and the black hole factory, and the gradual ecodestructive undermining in all registers the very conditions of life, have only strengthened this hypothesis. I, therefore, see very fit the announcement according to which a certain hypothesis of total destruction watches over deconstruction, whence my own work with the sollicitation of science, or rather scientificity, in general finds it accomplice. Only an understanding of the explosive virographematics of an unacknowledged nigraphy irreducibly integral to any scientificity in general, may ease the current inversalization of spatiotemporality. As Weber rightly points out, we are about to decide whether future is to have any future, that is to say whether we can and should resist the multifaceted undermining of futuricity in general.

What will we not have been desiring, for so long, so consistently albeit secretively! All while the most dominant discourses, without exception, with all their might of science, consciousness, and conscience, professed truth, beauty, and the good. But would we today acknowledge the desire of nothing and the nothing of desire, as it manifests itself in the real, being these things: true, beautiful, and good? What was dreamt of, however, and explicitly expressed as such, was a prospering world community obliged by firmly established norms of the good and the beauty. In reality, as the foreclosure of an irreducibly nigraphic desire produces its uncanny returns and inversions in this very reality, we are firmly afoot on something, in a Lacanian language already heavily indebted to Heidgger, “which puts us on the path of ex-istance,” or, if directly applying the Heideggerian lexicon, on the path of our “being held into nothing.” For Lacan, desire is inscribed more in the mystical discourse than anything else, it is because this discourse respects the nothing (EE, 130), in close affinity with Derrida’s description of desire, to wit, as the “song of an immortality without proof, prayer without religion, tears” (Épreuves d’écriture, 273).

In Talmudic tradition, throughout the centuries, Elijah appears as the question-without-answer, even the insistence that there is no answer, can be no one, that the question will not ever be brought to a halt, to a conclusion, or to a decision. Has not Derrida, through constant recourse to such figures as undecidability, différance, and general iterability, and so many more, sacrificed his life to demonstrate how the metonymical figure of the Elijah hunts any discourse, that Elijah is our very universal? And thus the Ja, the originary affirmation? And the dangerous perhaps? And so many other examples. And therefore that the question of the Elijah and the Elijah of the question is the very desire? Elijah is “the most ‘eschatological’ and thus the most awaited of the prophets,” and since he had “condemned the Israelites for breaking the alliance, God supposedly … appointed him to be present at each circumcision as at the renewal of the alliance” (“Circumfession,” x). Referring to Michel de Certeau, the “guardian of circumcision” is mentioned several times in the Bible as frequenting Mount Carmel, he goes on to quote him that this ascent to to Mount Carmel signifies the pursuit of the “science of circumcision,” which in our language here, which is to say from the perspective of science no less than mysticism, renders as a science of desire. The language of desire, even language in general, “has started without us, in us and before us. This is what theology calls God, and it is necessary, it will have been necessary, to speak” (“How toAvoid Speaking: Denials,” in Coward and Foshay, Derrida and Negative Theology, pp. 98-9). The hypothesis of total destruction, as it governs and guides every footstep of deconstruction, thus reveals to us the necessary though foreclosed relation between, first the discourses of mysticism and modern science, as well as, second, the equally necessary relation between those discourses and the truly scandalous catastrophe that results from the predicament of modern science neglecting the since long established fact that it can never sneak into the very workings of cosmos so as to heterogeneously effect the course of things without it having disastrous consequences.



Existence has become a wager, as if a Schrödinger’s Cat: is it alive, or is it not? Is it both at the same time? According to cutting edge discourse, knowledge will from now, which is to say if it is to grow, structurally involve possible drawbacks some of which could be of existential risk. It could seem that this cutting edge discourse, which is far from new, which in fact is very old, operates a conception of truth which establishes an internal relation of proportion between the magnitude of colliding things into smithereens and degree of truth. The very Truth itself would thus seem to be identical with ultimate collision. It is in this context that the Large Hadron Collider will only constitute a temporary phase towards finding truth. Or, alternatively, as risks grow as is already affirmed and acknowledged by cutting edge discourses, existence itself comes at stake.From now on, the Large Hadron Collider will only have to be built larger and larger.

Did not religion, the avantgarde of religion, to wit Christianity, already posit this? That the Empty Tomb is humankind’s first acknowledgment of this? That our God is Nothing, the empty space itself? We commit ourselves to this, symbolizing the ulterior oath to our God-become-man-become-nothing by drinking his blood and eating his flesh: man eats man away, homo homini lupus. Science is, in this particular context, the continuation of religion with other means; science pursues in the real what religion already had symbolically signaled. Humankind’s greatest achievement, de jure and de facto, is manufacturing black holes.

The only means for wagering whether to undertake the next phase of the experiment on ulterior Truth is our non-corroborated, highly speculative theories. If theory sanctions the continuation of the experiment, we will wager as to whether the possible gains are greater than the possible risks. Will there not always be a theory that sanctions such? We know it will be; such has always been the history of truth. Truth itself requires this. The wager will always be in favor of colliding more and deeper. One often says that homo sapiens has no instincts, at least not when measured against other animals, and explains that such is due to the fact of an explosion in our nerve system. But this is not fully true it could seem. Is not what we name ‘truth’ our ulterior instinct, which we follow as if without the slightest amount of autonomy? Truth requires, of us, always the all ways.

It makes one think of a rather uncanny thought: are we not already a black hole? Is life itself not the nascent coming-into-being of black holes, such that wherever one can observe a black hole one can also know that there in the midst of it there was once a life form? Are we not simply the black hole coming into being, here, in the vicinity of the planet we call Tellus? What can escape us? Not even light escapes. Nothing escapes the eye that soon is to evolve as the human eye that sees all things, into things de rien, a panoptic eye for which nothing will remain unseen, an eye out of which eventually comes black holes. We already manufacture black holes, collisions in the speed of light, operating a quark factory, and the biggest desire is to obtain an even fuller “truth,” which is synonymous with increasing the magnitude of our experimental collisions of what we hold as the ulterior constituents of being itself such as it is in and of itself. According to a few scientist’s rather speculative ideas, cutting edge discourse has it that the mass production of black holes will not represent a big risk since they will radiate and evaporate instantly. De rien à rien?

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