Husserl will contend that the mathematical object—or the matheme as already defined elsewhere—is ideal, ideal through and through, having no share in matter and sensibility, to wit, the so-called ‘real world.’ No share with material bindings and its irreducibly reciprocal meshwork of ever differential implications, it is thoroughly transparent, lifted away from the Real, exhausted by its properly own phenomenality. Linguistics, e.g., partakes of bounded idealities; the matheme is the one non-thing that partakes of free idealities. The matheme is thus freed from any particular subjectivity, empiricity, and is simply what it appears, or phenomenalizes, to be. It is always already reduced to its own phenomenal appearing as such, neither more nor less. If it appears at all, it appears for a certain something, and this certain something can only be a pure and transcendental consciousness. If one wants a Husserlian phenomenology to be coherent, it is necessary that there are such free, purely ideal, entities. Which is why Husserl often stress that the matheme is irreal.
Prior to coming-into existence there is nothing, nil. Solely a there-being, thus dependent upon the enigmatic passage from the Nothing to Being, can ever attest that things are, that there is an existence and that dead and living things perdure. Upon vanishing from existence there is again the Nothing.
From the side of what we call Death there is really nothing; it is Life that posits itself as a Something. Could we not thus be posited as such Schrödinger cats?