Reflections on Manichaeistic Ontology

Husserl putting empirical existence in parentheses to access the real, the evident, phenomenal essentiality; eidetic and transcendental reductions, peeling off

layer after layer of obscurities, echoes, and demiurges, to get to the kernel. What is truth really? Compared to obscurities, echoes and deceptions, demiurges?

Are not the two sides in secret complicity? What would truth be, how would it phenomenalize, without its other? Would it, at all? Much the same as Jesus

would not have the least chance to appear without Judas. Derrida has taught us all about this kind of logic. But in his view this logic is autoimmune. Much as

Jesus dies away from autoimmune diseases, so with truth: its condition of possibility is simultaneously its condition of impossibility. This is the only clear and

distinct idea that remains.

.

.

.

Is existence like this in itself, obscured by obscurities that as integral accomplices are the sine qua none of truth shining forth as clear and distinct?  (Supposing

that Husserl managed to circumvent one form or other of Manichaeism, this Persian rather eclectic doctrine originating in the 3rd century[1]—what we here

take for granted, just as an auxiliary measure taken.) Nevertheless, is not Manichaeism the very condition for such classic ontological conceptions, no matter

how modern it is pimped, if he is not to be forced to accept the truth of the obscurity the back way door? Where the two switches roles, and mirrors each other

indefinitely. Heterogeneous but still inextricably linked. Derrida the obscurantist terrorist—said Foucault.

.

.

.

Is not Manichaeism the very possibility of entrance into to very most subtle, advanced, and modern form of classical metaphysics, which is to say Husserlian

transcendental phenomenology? The Manichaeist is always accomplice to the essentialist metaphysician; such is the law governing their discourses. How are

the deviations to be explained? No other way than through some form of moralism or other. Whatever term chosen, you will end up with a split ontology.

Husserl’s enigmatic parallelism, e.g. between transcendental psychology and transcendental phenomenology, that ultra-transparent sheet of nothing—a sheet

with no substance, needless to say, transparency itself—that all of phenomenology hangs on, is definitively in close affiliation. Husserl wants to have the truth

of the world as pure phenomenon, subtracted from it what otherwise is what makes it what it is. A shadow in full colours.

.

.

.

But whereas it is light, angles and objects that produces shadows, with Husserl it is the nothing conditioning the possibility of the parallel at the heart of

transcendental phenomenology that creates a real sifted true nothing, refracted through the nothing letting only a thin mental trace remain, this after-effect

then hypostatized as truth.

.

.

.

The first critical threshold at which we first glimpse mensopolitics: when philosophy arrived as Platonism; and we do not overlook the fact there was

Platonism before Plato himself copied his masters voice. A pure power play. A systematic, global biopolitics came much later on the scene.

Install dominion in the mind, and the mind will be programmed to think it has left religion, that it has matured. But such it is under its sway only in an even

more subtle and refined way; by way of rationality, religiously powered power is blocked from critique. Inculcation is clearly the favored son.

.

.

.

What is this thought? It makes its power untouchable. Its motives are the noblest, allied to the very truth as it is. Even if it has not de facto attained the truth

—and such admits the more humble and cunning of thought—it is to be respected as being beyond critique since it has waved that, de jure, the way to the truth

as its only end. The concept of end here plays a peculiar role.

.

.

.

Clearly we need a share of cognitive paranoia thinking about these themes. It is so common always to lend ones best will to thought. Did we really thing that

religious dominion would fell in one swoop as soon as philosophy claimed rationality, and that rationality was nondebatable, since rationality is a faithful

cooperation of various faculties of the mind as to the quest of Truth, truth being, yes, what?

.

.

.

There has been so many shifting views on this, and as there still is no agreement about this, the very conception of truth betrays itself: is not truth supposed to

be communal, something that one cannot not accept? At least this is how truth is construed. Even the subjectivist conceptions of insurrection to objective, real,

ideal, common truth, share this feat. Truth is everywhere what no one should deny, even be it of the most subjective felt kind. Here too one shares—with

oneself, and one stands up for ones next instantiation of ones self. Truth is not what is says it is—or what it promises to be.

.

.

.

Perhaps we here clearer see what is its most interesting character: that of total submission. Of course one can—one is perfectly able, it is in fact possible, and it

has been done many times—gainsay truth, and say no whatsoever; at the price of ones sanity however. Even a dated, extremely old-fashioned religion such as

present-day Islam is just on par with this. They have simply dropped the ornaments, and are so not so much in thrall of hypocrisy as we are. No wonder that the

one most acute “conflict” is between the West and Islamistic terrorists: they do share the same discourse. Deep down it is not a conflict at all; they share the

same end. Here we do see Manichaeism enter once again.

.

.

.

Even if you held the gainsayer to be mad, from where comes this madness, if the real is true and good—and compliant, as an automaton, to commands of truth?

There is no other solution than inculcating a theodicy which is actually a very mundane form of terror against unwilling people. Social moral is the key here. So

it is a question exclusively about power. Or, alternatively, one could try madness as error in nature. This too brings truth out where it says it doesn’t belong.

They are amusing the preferred and predominant strategies for seizing and attaining power: the ones of a thither world await full of threats and miseries, and,

on the other hand, a hither world of irresistible choir song. The most interesting: how come these are the most efficient strategies? How come so many of us fall

prey to them? A success recipe like those one never leaves without reason, if not other, better ones turn up.

.

.

.

What is truth, if we assume we manage to find some core feats characterizing all or most of various truth conceptions? And there are certain feats that haunt the

term, revenants, remnants: the reverend is to be feared, the one who the most readily, without much thought, assimilates itself to truth given. To be revered:

17th century French, révérer, or the Latin revereri, from ‘re-’ (here as expressing intensive force) and ‘vereri,’ ‘to fear.’

.

.

.

But life eats the other, always nothing but the other, which is itself, soliphageous as it is. The one that split, and the parts that can no longer agree as to they

being parts of something or parts of anything. The part can’t decide as to be of the one or not. In all of its split compartments life is solipsistic, only eating what

it can know. A phenomenon like split personality is not an oddity pertaining to humankind alone, but something that humankind realizes in its own way.

.

.

.

Thought as immune ambassador; never to stand before a court.

.

.

.


[1] A dualistic religious system with Christian, Gnostic, Buddhist, Zoroastrianism, and pagan elements, founded in Persia in the 3rd century by Manes ( c. 216– c. 276). The system was based on a supposed primeval conflict between light and darkness, spirit and matter. It spread widely in the Roman Empire and in Asia, and survived in Chinese Turkestan until the 13th century. And further.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s

%d bloggers like this: