The ubiquitism of science: ambitions of the omni fluently transposed to commanding practical reality by way of omnispatiotemporal theories, conspicuous instances of which would be the panopticon and the panspectrum, virtual reality, the science of the masses in its double genitive, the science of the generic, euthanasia, etc. The ubiquitism of science—and ubiquitism is the very “ismism” of science—draws lines from Plato on, only now to crack.
Oontology, thus, cracks: the world egg harbours, or so it seems, nature’s auto-cataclysm. Seems it all was about fissuring, fissuring the convolutions, foldings and curvatures of phusis. Thus the Large Hadron Collider commands the clinamens and smashes subatomic particles to provide humankind with one monarchic Grand Unified Theory of Everything: one oon, egg. Crashes only, or so theory goes, in speeds approximately those of of light, will provide the smoothest possible oontology. Episteme qua egg. From Plato on, Deleuze and Guattari being oontology’s recently most fashionable proponents.
The oontologist epoch of science requires a strict regime of commanding the senses, making the senses “synergistic.” The only road thereto is by way of calibrating the human senses. Making a universe out of the originary supplementarity of disseminative sensiverses. This, science says, is the condition of possibility of authentic episteme. While sensiverses are calibrated towards unity, truth comes by blowing things to smithereens. This is theory.
Heidegger wrote, for instance, that the world worlds (die Welt weltet), time times (die Zeit zeitet), language speaks (die Sprache spricht), or that the nothing nothings (das Nichts nichtet). But he would never write that the future futures (die Zukunft zukunftet).
Our conception of causality: is it not fundamentally founded upon a trope of an a tergo? There are, of course, conceptualizations suggesting ‘reversible time.’ Nonetheless, it is critical to ask for its motivation and actual import. Are, then, not these re-current notions in modern physics rather a gesture so as to expand the hold of past upon present and future? The billiard ball that gets hit by another ball: is it all past powers that act? How could it be? How could we be sure? Should we not rather try and allow ourselves, for once, for the sake of argument, be disturbed by the possibility that there is a certain futuricity that at all allows what we call causality?