Husserl will contend that the mathematical object—or the matheme as already defined elsewhere—is ideal, ideal through and through, having no share in matter and sensibility, to wit, the so-called ‘real world.’ No share with material bindings and its irreducibly reciprocal meshwork of ever differential implications, it is thoroughly transparent, lifted away from the Real, exhausted by its properly own phenomenality. Linguistics, e.g., partakes of bounded idealities; the matheme is the one non-thing that partakes of free idealities. The matheme is thus freed from any particular subjectivity, empiricity, and is simply what it appears, or phenomenalizes, to be. It is always already reduced to its own phenomenal appearing as such, neither more nor less. If it appears at all, it appears for a certain something, and this certain something can only be a pure and transcendental consciousness. If one wants a Husserlian phenomenology to be coherent, it is necessary that there are such free, purely ideal, entities. Which is why Husserl often stress that the matheme is irreal.
…treatment of the catastrophe. Greek, katastrophē, first: the end (the end of life, the dénouement of a dramatic plot, the end of the play), and second, a reversal or upset, “the tragic and unforeseeable event that brings about the ruin of the established order. Catastrophe, therefore, relates as much to trajectories of truth, the very accomplishment, as to the “accident whose surprise interrupts the teleological trajectory.” Strephein gives strophe, “to come and go,” “to turn toward,” two senses: to sojourn, and swirling, wandering. But still the Odyssey of Ulysses, the first being the very form of an economy, the possibility of returning home. “Oikonomia would always follow the path of Ulysses.” He goes only in view of repatriating himself. Immune, the origin does not travel. Expatriation only lasts for a certain time, softened in advance; Penelope does everything to not “lose the thread.” “Phenomenology may no more be the absolute master of its house. Ontology may already be in its place.”
Science abhors the law of general iterability, pretending that somehow it is enabled to keep general iterability at bay, pretending that it is constituted by some form of special iterability. Such presuppositions, common as they are, are none the less false. Already during the first half of the 20. century, however, we saw a dawning recognition of what here is referred to as the law of general iterability. Edmund Husserl was probably the first to catch a glimpse of this law that, de jure and de facto, is the very sine qua non of science and scientificity in general. Jacques Derrida’s scrupulous reading of Husserl during the 50s, 60s, and 70s, still articulates, by far, most comprehensive attempt at outlining the imports and implications of the law of general iterability.
Tympanize — philosophy, Derrida wrote. Tympanize — science too, I’d say.