Marges de la philosophie

TYMPAN « La thèse et l’antithèse et leur démonstration ne présentent donc rien d’autre que ces affirmations opposées: une limite est (eine Grenze ist) et la limite n’est aussi bien qu’une limite relevée (aufge- hobene); la limite a un au-delà avec lequel toutefois elle se tient en rapport (in Beziehung steht), vers lequel elle doit … Continue reading

Is the matheme transparent and exhausted by its phenomenality?


Husserl will contend that the mathematical object—or the matheme as already defined elsewhere—is ideal, ideal through and through, having no share in matter and sensibility, to wit, the so-called ‘real world.’ No share with material bindings and its irreducibly reciprocal meshwork of ever differential implications, it is thoroughly transparent, lifted away from the Real, exhausted by its properly own phenomenality. Linguistics, e.g., partakes of bounded idealities; the matheme is the one non-thing that partakes of free idealities. The matheme is thus freed from any particular subjectivity, empiricity, and is simply what it appears, or phenomenalizes, to be. It is always already reduced to its own phenomenal appearing as such, neither more nor less. If it appears at all, it appears for a certain something, and this certain something can only be a pure and transcendental consciousness. If one wants a Husserlian phenomenology to be coherent, it is necessary that there are such free, purely ideal, entities. Which is why Husserl often stress that the matheme is irreal.

On Jacques Derrida’s Parasitology

“The virus is in part a parasite that destroys, that introduces disorder into communication,” alas! Paul De Man’s warning that “the impossibility of reading should not be taken too lightly,” is more than fit. What had not already Derrida said about ‘communication’ in Signature, Event, Context? We are still Kantians with a view to ‘communication.’ Newton’s ideological gravitational force made Kant fall, and the naive question asked: “What are the conditions of possibility of knowledge?” Still not daring to critically question the mythological horizon of our age old metaphysical tradition, we continue in the vein of Kant: “What are the conditions of possibility of communication?” How dare one call oneself a thinker without scrupulously inquiring after conditions of impossibility? And this is indeed what Derrida does. In his entire oeuvre, in fact.

Unidentified Flying Objects: Parallelism, Virtuality, Immanence, Transcendence

The specter, the revenant, and the revenance is coming from what is to come—futurity—in the degree to which we blind ourselves in our simulatory spatiality. Now there will always be interferences, because every gramma is simulation. But the spectrality is sounder, it seems, if recognized as of futurity, and not as a assemble belts from past to present, making its interruptions and disturbances the motive for maiming presence. If I should try to determine further what past is, I would say that it is to be related to the iterativity of futurity as what definitely will not come, only can not-come, already shit out of the what-is-to-come; this is what the past is, however “valuable” one may deem it, in other respects.

General Iterability: Derrida Grafting Science

Science abhors the law of general iterability, pretending that somehow it is enabled to keep general iterability at bay, pretending that it is constituted by some form of special iterability. Such presuppositions, common as they are, are none the less false. Already during the first half of the 20. century, however, we saw a dawning recognition of what here is referred to as the law of general iterability. Edmund Husserl was probably the first to catch a glimpse of this law that, de jure and de facto, is the very sine qua non of science and scientificity in general. Jacques Derrida’s scrupulous reading of Husserl during the 50s, 60s, and 70s, still articulates, by far, most comprehensive attempt at outlining the imports and implications of the law of general iterability.

Tympanize — philosophy, Derrida wrote. Tympanize — science too, I’d say.

Fare Well My Loves, Derrida, &c, Cixous. Part I

…There is nothing but writing, in a certain sense, but writing uses a space a blank space, an ignorant biblion, bibliophoros, what carries letters; it has to space in order to be in the writing of its writing. The blank space is also the fortress buttressing, then by spacing writing all it can, against the Nothing that Derreath traces in Husserl but that just as well might be directly related to writing written here as Iou have wrote.

There are at least six things to remember, when reading and writing, experiencing: first the almost immediate Nothing in the very banal concreteness of the blank, the spacing, and the grammas; second the Nothing that the writer faces faced toward the paper and screen; third the Nothing between the intended writer and the intended reader; fourth the Nothing the reader faces looking into those spaced grammas; fifth the Nothing that ships texts out with no possible addressee; and sixth that Nothing that says that total death and absence is the very condition of possibility of there being decipherable texts.

L’écriture et la différence

“Le silence est un mot qui n’est pas un mot et le souffle un objet qui n’est pas un objet.” (G. BATAILLE)

[…] et strictement parallèle à la phénoménologie. Or le franchissement de cette invisible différence qui sépare des parallèles n’est pas innocent : il est le geste le plus subtil et le plus ambitieux de l’abus psychologiste. […] Pour éclaircir la distance qui doit séparer une psychologie phénoménologique d’une phénoménologie transcendantale, il faudrait interroger sur ce rien qui les empêche de se rejoindre, sur cette parallélité qui libère l’espace d’une question transcendantale. Ce rien est ce qui permet la réduction transcendantale. La réduction transcendantale est ce qui convertit notre attention vers ce rien où la totalité du sens et le sens de la totalité laissent apparaître leur origine. C’est-à-dire, selon l’expression de Fink, l’origine du monde.

A magnificent work, sure to graft itself into virographematics and the solicitation of science.

Writing Science: Grammageneous Idealities

It is harangued that Derrida is the “first major philosopher to philosophize about writing,” but what remains is that his Introduction relates writing in general to science in general, to scientificity. In his De la grammatologie Derrida phoned, collect call, back the Introduction, as happened in his La voix et le phénomène: Introduction au problème du signe dans la phenomenology de Husserl, as also in his L’écriture et la difference, all appearing 1967. 5 years later, in 1972, the insistence on writing and science, scientific writing, and writing science is still rather easy to trace, with La dissémination, Marges de la philosophie, and Positions. Entretiens avec Henri Ronse, Julia Kristeva, Jean-Louis Houdebin, Guy Scarpetta. Then, 5 more years: Limited Inc. After 1977, the imprints of Introduction surface in 1990, in Le problème de la gènese dans la philosophie de Husserl—actually Derrida’s 1954 Master’s thesis. After 1977, for the rest of his life, 27 years, Derrida never in insistence surfaced again with this insister of writing and science. Still, we shall see that many other works and texts allude to and trace the origin of his thought, an “origin” that self-referentially writes a fourth text.