Heidegger wrote, for instance, that the world worlds (die Welt weltet), time times (die Zeit zeitet), language speaks (die Sprache spricht), or that the nothing nothings (das Nichts nichtet). But he would never write that the future futures (die Zukunft zukunftet).
Our conception of causality: is it not fundamentally founded upon a trope of an a tergo? There are, of course, conceptualizations suggesting ‘reversible time.’ Nonetheless, it is critical to ask for its motivation and actual import. Are, then, not these re-current notions in modern physics rather a gesture so as to expand the hold of past upon present and future? The billiard ball that gets hit by another ball: is it all past powers that act? How could it be? How could we be sure? Should we not rather try and allow ourselves, for once, for the sake of argument, be disturbed by the possibility that there is a certain futuricity that at all allows what we call causality?